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Missouri v. Jenkins: The Beginning of the End for
Desegregation
I. INTRODUCTION
Before Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown I"),' schools de-
prived black children of equal educational opportunities. In general,
the educational system consisted of two school systems: one for
whites and one for non-whites.2 Although the United States Supreme
Court, in Plessy v. Ferguson,3 required that separate facilities be
equal, under the separate educational systems, blacks received an infe-
rior education.4 In some states, black schools received only thirty
percent of the per student funding given to white schools. 5 Moreover,
white institutions were issued higher quality books and materials than
those issued in black institutions.6 Black schools also received sub-
standard instruction and supervision.7
Changing the quality of education in black schools to equal the
quality of education in white schools, however, would not have ade-
quately addressed the problem of inferiority in minority schools.8 In
Brown I, the Supreme Court recognized the extreme importance of ed-
ucation. 9 The Court's decision reached beyond the tangible differ-
ences between black and white schools. The Court could not rely on
tangible differences because, under the reasoning of Plessy, such dif-
ferences no longer existed.'0 Instead, the Court recognized that sepa-
rate educational facilities, even if equal, generate feelings of inferiority
that may affect the "hearts and minds [of blacks] in a way unlikely ever
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
2. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
3. 163 U.S. 537, 544-48 (1896).
4. See infra notes 50, 53, and accompanying text.
5. See infra part I.A.
6. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
8. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493-94 (noting that there are some "'qualities which are in-
capable of objective measurement but which make for greatness"') (quoting Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)); see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (explaining that the Brown I Court
looked at the effect of segregation when justifying school integration).
10. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 492-94 (looking beyond the tangible differences to discern
the actual effect of segregation on children).
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to be undone."" The Court found that segregated educational facilities
were inherently unequal. 2
After the Brown I decision, many blacks challenged the constitu-
tionality of segregated school systems. 13 In the more than forty years
since the Brown I decision, school authorities and district courts have
been implementing school desegregation plans. 14 Once the courts
found a constitutional violation, school authorities initiated desegrega-
tion plans. 15 If found inadequate, the district courts exercised their
discretion in implementing their own desegregation orders and de-
crees.16
In most instances, school authorities failed to implement effective
desegregation plans. 7 Consequently, district courts often used their
broad discretion to implement desegregation measures. 18 Because so
many district courts became involved in desegregation matters, today it
1 1. Id. at 494.
1 2. Id. at 495.
13. See, e.g., infra part II.D-E.
14. See, e.g., infra part II.D-E. Forty years after Brown I mandated desegregation,
children in the inner city continued to attend single-race schools. Deborah E. Beck,
Note, Jenkins v. Missouri: School Choice as a Method for Desegregation an Inner-City
School District, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1029-30 (1993) (analyzing Jenkins v. Missouri,
639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that segregation caused a reduction in stu-
dent achievement), affd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 816 (1987)).
15. The Supreme Court instructed the school districts to make a prompt and reason-
able start toward desegregating schools. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300
(1955) [hereinafter Brown 1]. School authorities have the primary responsibility for
assessing and solving the problem of segregation. Id. at 299. See also ALBERT P.
BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE C. FERGUSON, JR., DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING
AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES 172 (2d ed. 1962) (analyzing desegrega-
tion cases). The Brown 11 Court feared interfering with the domain of local authorities.
Beck, supra note 14, at 1038. Therefore, the Court issued only guidelines to lower
courts so local authorities could retain discretion in fashioning appropriate remedies.
Id.
16. The Court gave district courts the power to enter any decrees that would be most
effective and just. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 164. The district
courts had the task of fashioning remedies to cure the ills of segregation. J. Skelly
Wright, De Facto School Desegregation: An Examination of the Legal and Consti-
tutional Questions Presented, in DEFACTO SEGREGATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS: STRUGGLE FOR
LEGAL AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 24 (Oliver Schroeder, Jr. & David T. Smith eds., 1965)
[hereinafter DEFACTO SEGREGATION].
17. Daniel J. McMullen & Irene H. McMullen, Stubborn Facts of History-The
Vestiges of Past Discrimination in School Desegregation Cases, 44 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 75, 76 (1993) ("It is difficult to determine precisely how many school districts
across the country remain involved in litigation over their constitutional duty to deseg-
regate previously de jure segregated public schools, but they number, conservatively, in
the hundreds.").
18. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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is difficult to discern how many school districts still remain under the
authority of the district courts.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Missouri v. Jenkins20
makes it clear that the district courts must now begin to relinquish their
authority to school officials.2' In Jenkins, the Supreme Court limited
the power of the district courts to rectify problems caused by school
segregation. 22 Thus, the Court's decision effectively overrules long-
standing precedent allowing district courts broad discretion in fashion-
ing desegregation remedies.23
This Note first reviews the Civil Rights Act,24 focusing on the Act's
impact on school segregation.25 This Note then examines the history
of school desegregation cases.26 Next, this Note discusses the facts
and opinions of Jenkins.27 Then this Note critically analyzes the Jen-
kins decision and the new constitutional limits it places on district
courts in light of the Supreme Court's past decisions.28 Finally, this
Note addresses the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Jen-
kins, 29 and concludes that the Jenkins decision, by resurrecting the
rationales from Plessy v. Ferguson, will significantly limit the federal
district courts' power to eliminate the effects of segregation.'
19. See supra note 17.
20. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
21. See infra part III.B.
22. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2054.
23. See id. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that, under the reasoning of Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 296 (1976), a district court "may indeed subject a govern-
mental perpetrator of segregative practices to an order of relief with intended conse-
quences beyond the perpetrator's own subdivision . . . so long as the decree does not
bind the authorities of the other government units that are free of violation and segrega-
tive effects"). See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Gautreaux Court's holding.
24. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (1994)).
25. See infra part II.A.
26. See infra part IL.B-E.
27. See infra part III.
28. See infra part IV.
29. See infra part V.
30. See infra part V.B.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Protections: The Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment
After the Civil War, many white citizens refused to recognize blacks
as free citizens. In fact, in many states, blacks had no right to pur-
chase land or participate in certain occupations. 3' Hence, blacks did
not enjoy the same rights as whites. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
guaranteed to citizens of every race the same rights enjoyed by white
citizens.32 The Civil Rights Act marked the beginning of the promise
of equal rights for blacks.33 The Act, however, did not forbid all
forms of racial discrimination.34 Rather, the Act contained a list of
rights guaranteed to former slaves that states could not take away.35
The Act countered "Black Codes" 3 6 adopted by the Southern states
3 1. In some states, blacks had no right to purchase land on which they lived and
farmed. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1872). Moreover, many blacks were
excluded from certain occupations and were not permitted to testify in a court of law in
cases where white men were parties. Id.
32. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000 (1994)). The Act states:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States
and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and
color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real personal prop-
erty, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to
like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, or-
dinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id. See also Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947, 955 (1995) (analyzing how the Civil Rights Act of 1866 helped frame
the Fourteenth Amendment).
33. McConnell, supra note 32, at 957-58.
34. Id. at 958.
35. Id. (stating that although the Act exclusively required equality with respect to cer-
tain specified rights, these specified rights did not include political rights).
36. Black Codes were "laws [that] saddled Negroes with 'onerous disabilities and bur-
dens, and curtailed their rights ...to such an extent that their freedom was of little
value."' Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 426 (1968) (quoting Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70). Black Codes imposed special controls over blacks. John
H. Franklin, The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1141
(1990). In some states, blacks could not appear in the town as anything other than me-
nial servants. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70.
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which prohibited former slaves from owning land or holding certain
jobs."
Although never challenged in court, original supporters of the 1866
Act questioned its constitutionality and sought to pass a constitutional
amendment to alleviate their fears.18 The Fourteenth Amendment 39
cured what the supporters perceived to be constitutional problems with
the Act by providing a firm constitutional basis for the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866.40 The Fourteenth Amendment, however, surpassed the
boundaries of the Act, encompassing a broader range of rights.4'
37. Congress enacted the 1866 Act to "confer citizenship, to ensure the elimination
of overt discrimination through acts of slavery, to render void state discriminatory laws,
especially the Black Codes, and, most importantly, to eradicate the badges of slavery."
Cynthia A. Leiferman, Comment, Private Clubs: A Sanctuary for Discrimination?, 40
BAYLOR L. REV. 71, 89-90 (1988). The elimination of discriminatory laws, however,
was not the sole purpose for the enactment of the Act. Franklin, supra note 36, at 1141.
The Act focused on the white private landowner violations of the fundamental rights of
blacks. Id. When the Act was introduced to Congress, these fundamental rights were not
specifically defined. Id. Representative Wilson, however, the introducer of the bill, de-
clared that "[w]hatever these great fundamental rights are, we must be invested with
power to legislate for their protection or our Constitution fails in the first and most im-
portant office of government." Id. at 1142 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. James F. Wilson)).
38. McConnell, supra note 32, at 958 ("From its inception, however, the 1866 Act
was plagued with doubts as to its constitutionality."). Congressmen and scholars chal-
lenged the Civil Rights Act of 1866 because of its vagueness. Frederick M. Lawrence,
Civil Rights And Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67
TUL. L. REV. 2113, 2131 (1993). The Act lacked precision in terms such as "rights,
privileges, and immunities." Id. Moreover, scholars felt that the vagueness of the 1866
Act would flood the courts with litigation. Id. In 1870, supporters of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 relied on the powers of the Fourteenth Amendment to re-enact the Act be-
cause of the constitutional criticism leveled against it. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR.,
supra note 15, at 87.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. The last lines of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment set out the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Specifically, the Equal Protection Clause states "nor shall any State...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. "The
purpose of this provision was to secure to non-white citizens the same laws for the pro-
tection of property and personal security as the state had enacted for white citizens,
since without such protection none of the civil rights of non-white citizens would have
been of much value." HERMINE H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: JUDICIAL EROSION OF THE CONSTITUTION THROUGH THE MISUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 150-51 (1977).
40. McConnell, supra note 32, at 960.
41. Id. at 960-61. One scholar has noted:
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The Fourteenth Amendment sought to secure absolute equality
among blacks and whites before the law.42 Upon initial interpretation,
however, the Supreme Court severely limited the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment, finding that it did not guarantee blacks the right to
use the same facilities as whites.43 In 1896, the Supreme Court held,
in Plessy v. Ferguson,' that maintaining separate facilities for differ-
ent races is not a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.45 Under this "separate but equal" doctrine,
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment did not enumerate a list of protected rights, as did
the 1866 Act. Rather, it provided that '[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States'. If we accept [the] equation of 'civil rights and immunities' to the
phrase 'privileges or immunities,' the Amendment contains a provision iden-
tical to the clause of the 1866 bill that was dropped on account of being too
broad.
Id. at 961 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
42. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 96. In interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment, however, the Supreme Court in Plessy stated that the Amendment "could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms un-
satisfactory to either." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
43. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51. At the time of ratification, most states did not inter-
pret the Fourteenth Amendment as a prohibition on segregation. BLAUSTEIN &
FERGUSON, JR.,.supra note 15, at 65. Segregated schools existed before and after the rat-
ification of the Amendment. See supra note 14. Five states did outlaw segregated
schools upon the ratification of the Amendment. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra
note 15, at 64. Some never had segregated schools, while others abolished segregation
long before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The states' maintenance
of non-segregated schools was unrelated to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In adopting
the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may not have intended to outlaw segregation in
the public school system. Id. at 65.
In 1865, however, Andrew Jackson Rogers, a Democrat from New Jersey, recognized
that the Fourteenth Amendment would give Congress the power to compel black and
white children to attend the same school, and objected to the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 59.
44. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court held that requiring blacks and
whites to ride in separate rail cars on the train did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 548-49.
45. Id. at 544-48. The Court adopted the reasoning of Chief Justice Shaw, a
Massachusetts judge, who explained that:
"[A]II persons, without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin or con-
dition, are equal before the law .... But, when this great principle comes to be
applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not
warrant the assertion that men and women are legally clothed with the same
civil and political powers, and that children and adults are legally to have the
same functions and be subject to the same treatment; but only that the rights
of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the pater-
nal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and secu-
rity."
Id. at 544 (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849) (holding
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the Plessy Court reasoned that states could satisfy the Clause by pro-
viding substantially equal facilities, even though those facilities may be
separate.46
The Plessy Court's "separate but equal" doctrine allowed white
schools to deny admission to blacks. 47  As a result, two separate
school systems existed, one for white students and one for non-white
students.48 Blacks did not receive an equal education under this sys-
tem.49 For instance, school boards spent a fraction of the money used
to educate white students on schools educating black students. 50 Ad-
ditionally, in some areas, black students had to walk for miles to reach
rickety school houses, while white students enjoyed the luxury of
school bus transportation." Moreover, with few resources, black
that the law does not require the state to allow blacks to attend school with whites)). The
Plessy Court "classified the right to ride an unsegregated train and attend an unsegregated
school as inherently social." BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 99.
Therefore, under the reasoning of Plessy, "'[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially,
the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane."' Id.
(quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 547-49).
46. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 547-49.
47. Id. at 544 (citing Roberts, 59 Mass. at 198, where the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that a school committee has the power to designate separate schools
for black children and to prohibit their attendance in white schools). "Though fair on its
face, the separate-but-equal doctrine had been implemented, in the fifty-eight years since
the Court legitimized it, in a manner that blatantly deprived Negroes of equal educational
opportunities." RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 712 (1994).
48. Deborah Mayo-Jeffries, Discrimination In the Education Process Based On Race,
21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 21, 21 (1995). One commentator has noted that "Ohio and the Old
Northwest denied Negro children access to white public schools and forbade Negro mi-
gration, intermarriage, suffrage, and black jurors." Harvey Wish, A Historian Looks at
School Segregation, in DEFACTO SEGREGATION, supra note 16, at 81, 81.
49. Mayo-Jeffries, supra note 48, at 21.
50. Id. For example, in Mississippi, schools attended by only black students re-
ceived 30% of the funding given to white schools. Mayo-Jeffries, supra note 48, at 21.
Also, in 1951, Topeka, Kansas had 4 elementary schools for blacks, but it had 18 ele-
mentary schools for whites. KLUGER, supra note 47, at 375. One-hundred thousand
people resided within the city limits; 7.5% of those citizens were black. Id. at 372.
Moreover, in Kansas, no restaurants served blacks and only one colored motel existed.
Id. at 375. Blacks were forced to retreat into their own world. Id. Commentators have
noted that "[i]n 1912, per capita expenditure for Negro schools was $1.71, as compared
to the figure of $15 for all schools." BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at
103. Scholars did not consider such treatment as evidence of inequality because the
Supreme Court had previously held that it was not feasible to demand identical school fa-
cilities because absolute duplication would be impossible. Id. See also Cummings v.
Board of Educ. 175 U.S. 528, 542 (1899) (finding that school authorities possessed the
power to allocate school funds the way they deem most appropriate even if such alloca-
tion denies black children of certain benefits). The doctrine of separate but equal meant
only substantial equality. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 100-01.
51. Mayo-Jeffries, supra note 48, at 21. Black parents had to petition for school bus
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schools were able to provide students with only rudimentary train-
ing.52 In contrast, white schools had greater resources, resulting in a
better education for white students.53 In some states, the only funds
allocated for black schools consisted of those allocated for teachers'
salaries.54
Plessy did not adequately address the problems encountered by
blacks.55 For example, even though the Plessy decision required sepa-
rate black educational facilities to be equal, it did not address the prob-
lem of distant facilities.56 Therefore, even if black schools had been
otherwise equal to white schools, the black schools were often far
from the homes of black children. School districts did not provide
black children with adequate transportation to get to these distant and
inferior facilities.58
B. The Turning Point: Brown I
To counteract such unequal conditions, blacks and some concerned
whites set out on a journey to "dismantle the dual public school sys-
tem."59 In 1951, one black man in particular decided that instead of
lying idle while his daughter attended a segregated school, he would
challenge in court the constitutionality of the dual educational system in
his county.' His efforts resulted in the landmark decision, Brown 61
transportation for their children. Id.; see KLUGER, supra note 47, at 13-15.
52. Mayo-Jeffries, supra note 48, at 21.
53. Id. In most instances, black children walked by white schools on their way to
distant and inferior segregated black schools. Wish, supra note 48, at 86. Black chil-
dren crowded "in improvised day schools, night schools, and overworked Sunday
schools, convinced that reading and writing were evidence of a real free status." Id.
Moreover, blacks attended physically inferior schools compared to those of whites.
BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 105-06. In addition, the quality of in-
struction, school supervision, and the content of the curricula was of substandard quality
compared to that of white schools. Id. The general view in the South was that education
made blacks unfit for the only work they could do successfully, like menial tasks and
plantation labor. Wish, supra note 48, at 86.
54. Mayo-Jeffries, supra note 48, at 21. Moreover, black teachers received 30% less
pay than white teachers. Id. at 22.
55. See supra notes 51, 53, and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 51, 53, and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 51, 53, and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 51, 53, and accompanying text.
59. Mayo-Jeffries, supra note 48, at 22.
60. In 1951, Oliver Brown attempted to enroll his daughter in the Sumner school lo-
cated five blocks from his home in Topeka, Kansas. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra
note 15, at 40. Sumner denied his request because the school allowed only white chil-
dren to attend. Id. Mr. Brown's eight-year-old daughter had to walk seven blocks to a
bus stop to attend a black school some 20 miles away from her house. Id. Thus, Mr.
Brown sued the Topeka Board of Education for violating his daughter's Fourteenth
1996] Missouri v. Jenkins
where the Supreme Court ruled that separate educational facilities in
the public school system could no longer be considered equal.62 In
Brown I, the Court reasoned that segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race deprived minority children of equal
educational opportunities, even when physical facilities and other tan-
gible factors might be equal. 63 The Court further reasoned that sepa-
rate facilities generated a sense of inferiority among black students. 64
Amendment right to equal protection. John E. Canady, Jr., Comment, Overcoming
Original Sin: The Redemption of the Desegregated School System, 27 Hous. L. REV.
557, 558 (1990). Mr. Brown "was joined by a dozen more colored parents, rallied by the
local branch of the NAACP and represented by lawyers from the national organization's
main office in New York." KLUGER, supra note 47, at 372. Mr. Brown, like other
blacks, no longer wanted to be considered a second class citizen, but desired to be con-
sidered as whole as white citizens. Id. at 395.
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown I consisted of four cases in which the plaintiffs
fought to enjoin the enforcement of state provisions permitting schools to maintain
segregation. Id. at 486 n.l. See Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F. Supp. 920, 922 (E.D.S.C.
1952) (involving black children who brought an action to prohibit a provision in
Carendon County requiring separate public school for blacks and whites), rev'd sub nom.
Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 294 (holding that plaintiffs were only entitled to a facility equal to
whites); Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337, 340-41 (E.D. Va. 1952)
(involving black high school students who brought an action to forbid Virginia from
enforcing a state constitutional provision and a statutory provision requiring seg-
regation of blacks and whites in public schools), rev'd sub nom. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at
294 (holding that separate school systems were constitutional but requiring black facili-
ties to be equal to whites); Gebhart v. Belton, 87 A.2d 862, 871 (Del. Ch. 1952)
(involving black elementary and high school students in New Castle County who
brought an action seeking to prohibit enforcement of the Delaware state constitutional
provisions that required segregation of blacks and whites in public schools), aff'd sub
nom. Brown I!, 349 U.S. at 294 (ordering the state to equalize black and white schools
and allowing blacks admission to a white school until the black school was equalized to
the white schools).
62. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
63. Id. at 493. The Court's decision did not merely turn on tangible attributes, but
looked to the effect segregation in public schools had on black children. Id. at 492. The
Court reasoned that because education is the most important function of the state and lo-
cal government, it must be made available to all on equal terms. Id. at 493.
64. Id. at 494. The Court relied on the finding in the Kansas case that segregation of
white and black children in public schools had a detrimental effect upon black children.
Id. When social scientists testified in the four state cases consolidated in Brown I, they,
as experts, testified to the detrimental effect segregation has on black children.
BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 131. The Brown I Court simply adopted
the findings of the lower courts that segregation had a detrimental effect on blacks. Id.
The Court reasoned, as did the lower court in the Kansas case, that separation denoted in-
feriority among the black children. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494. The Court noted that
when the law sanctions segregation, the detrimental impact of segregation is great. Id.
"A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn." Id. Brown I focused
on the stigmatic injury caused by segregated schools. Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme
Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 50 (1992). Such injury produced "an abstract harm that is distinct from any
other observable harm." Id. In Brown I, the Court cited authorities in the form of socio-
724 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
The Court finally concluded that "in the field of public education, the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. 65 The Court further ex-
plained that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 66
Therefore, the Court held, state practices which mandated separate
schools for black and white students were unlawful.67 The decision
outlawed public school segregation and pronounced as unconstitu-
tional the educational laws of twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia.68
C. Post Brown I
While Brown I outlawed segregated schools, the opinion did not
explain how to implement desegregation plans.69 In Brown v. Board
of Education ("Brown I1"),70 the Court attempted to state, in general
terms, how a school system should be desegregated, and what kinds
of remedies should be available to plaintiffs.7' The Brown H Court
gave federal district courts authority over school districts, including the
power to determine if school districts violated Brown J.72 Brown H
allowed federal district courts to retain this authority until school sys-
tems became sufficiently integrated. 73 Brown H authorized courts to
create a system of determining public school admission policies on a
logical and psychological treatises on the subject of segregation that supported this
view. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 n.l . See also BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note
15, at 130 (analyzing the social scientists' data in Brown I).
65. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
66. Id. (rejecting the idea set forth in Plessy as it applies to education). It is not quite
clear why the nine justices came to this conclusion. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra
note 15, at 140. This conclusion is open to three different interpretations:
(1) that public school segregation is constitutionally invalid because it is
'unreasonable'; or (2) that public school segregation is invalid per se, but that
segregation by race might be constitutionally justified in fields other than ed-
ucation; or (3) that all classification by race is unconstitutional per se, and
that segregation in public education is thus merely an example of such invalid-
ity.
Id.
67. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
68. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 160.
69. In Brown 1, the Court handed down a decision but refrained from formulating any
decree necessary to implement the decision. Id. at 160-61. A year passed before blacks
were able to attend white schools. Id.
70. 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see supra note 15.
71. Id. at 300-01.
72. Id. at 299-301. The Brown 11 Court acknowledged that school authorities may
experience a variety of problems in transforming school districts into districts that are
in constitutional compliance. Id.
73. Id. at 301.
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non-racial basis. 4 Nonetheless, the Court gave school authorities the
primary responsibility of solving segregation problems.75
The guidelines set out by the Brown II Court proved to be less than
perfect.76 First, the Brown II solution did not allow courts to exercise
authority until someone filed suit.77 This hurdle slowed the remedial
process.78 Second, the Brown II Court handed down a decision
which was almost as vague as the Brown I decision. 79 The Brown H
Court did not give the district courts clear guidance on how to fashion
remedies. 80 Instead of giving concrete guidelines, the Brown II Court
relied on common sense in fashioning equitable doctrines for determin-
ing remedies for past segregation.8 1 These equitable doctrines gave
federal district courts tremendous flexibility in fashioning remedies.82
The Court "recognized the inequality implicit in intentional segrega-
tion, and made it clear that the stigmatic injury to black children caused
by such segregation [was] the harm to be remedied. 83 Segregation
74. Id. at 300-01.
75. id. at 299-301.
76. For example, the Brown 11 Court stated that district "courts will have to consider
whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles." Id. at 294. The Court further stated that district
courts are to be guided by traditional attributes of equity. Id. at 300.
77. BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 224.
78. Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 25 1,
308 (1992) (noting that Brown 11 implied that relief could be delayed, and recognizing
that even though relief may never come to the individual litigants in Brown 1, those liti-
gants would ultimately benefit). Remedies were delayed for a year and, in some in-
stances, delayed even further at the discretion of the district courts. BLAUSTEIN &
FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 161.
79. The Brown II decision added more ambiguity by mandating, without instruction,
that school systems "'admit [blacks] to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory
basis with all deliberate speed."' Brian K. Landsberg, The Randolph W. Thrower
Symposium Desegregation Law: The Changing Vision of Equality in Education, 42
EMORY L.J. 821, 825 (1993) (quoting Brown I1, 349 U.S. at 301).
80. Id. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993
Wis. L. REV. 627, 638 (arguing that Brown 1I lacked specific relief orders). By failing to
instruct the district courts, the Supreme Court adopted "a course of compromise and de-
lay." BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, JR., supra note 15, at 170.
8 1. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300. Under equitable principles, federal district courts had
the power to fashion just remedies. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. See also
Landsberg, supra note 79, at 825 (noting that "Brown I1's most important positive con-
tribution was its reliance on [an] equitable doctrine as an adjunct to constitutional law").
The Brown 1I decision laid the foundation for the later perception that "equitable relief
would have to address the systemic violation with a systemic remedy." Id.
82. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300 (stating that the lower courts should use equitable prin-
ciples in fashioning remedies, which calls for "practical flexibility in shaping ...
remedies").
83. John C. Casais, Note, Ignoring the Harm: The Supreme Court, Stigmatic Injury
and the End of School Segregation, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 259, 267 (1994)
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challenges brought after Brown H compelled the Supreme Court to
determine what remedies sufficiently vindicated the rights of young
school children."
D. The Road Toward Recovery
The Supreme Court further clarified Brown II in subsequent cases.
For example, in Green v. County School Board,5 the Supreme Court
held that district courts should measure the efficiency of a school's de-
segregation plan by the plan's effectiveness.86 Nevertheless, despite
the Green decision, school authorities continued to drag their feet and
defy integration decrees.87
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,88 the
Court stated a new objective in reviewing the constitutionality of a
school system: the Court asked whether authorities had eliminated all
"vestiges" of state-imposed segregation from public schools.89 The
Court did not specify, however, what aspects of education constitute
(emphasis added). The Court relied on equality of the mind and heart rather than equal
school facilities. KLUGER, supra note 47, at 711. Scholars have noted: "'The Court's
opinion read more like an expert paper on sociology than a Supreme Court opinion."'
Id. (quoting James Reston, A Sociological Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954). The
Brown 1I opinion seemed to have met Justice Warren's belief that opinions should be
"'short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-ac-
cusatory."' Id. (quoting Reston, supra). The Court, however, dismissed the historical
evidence surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to segre-
gated schools, and failed to note that "the overall purpose of the three Civil War
Amendments" was to "provide full citizenship to blacks." Id. at 711-12.
84. Casais, supra note 83, at 267 ("Initially, the Court considered a school district's
obligations fulfilled upon admission of students to its schools without regard to race.").
85. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). New Kent County in Virginia adopted a "freedom-of-
choice" provision which allowed students from grades second through seventh to choose
what school they wanted to attend. Id. at 433-35. No white student ever chose a black
school. Id. at 441. Although 115 black students enrolled in a formerly all-white
school, 85% of the black students attended an all-black school. id.
86. Landsberg, supra note 79, at 825. In 1968, the Court defined school authorities'
obligations. Id. For example, in Green, "the Court disapproved of a formerly de jure
segregated school system's freedom of choice plan that had left the schools substan-
tially segregated." Id. (citing Green, 391 U.S. at 435).
87. Id. (noting that little progress was made in areas where dual school systems had
historically been maintained by operation of state laws). In Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court noted that "[o]ver the 16 years since Brown
H1, many difficulties.were encountered in implementation of the basic constitutional re-
quirement that the State not discriminate between public school children on the basis of
their race." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971).
88. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Swann, after the school board provided an unsatisfactory
desegregation plan, the district court ordered the school board to adopt one of the three
plans submitted to it by experts. Id. at 6-14.
89. Id. at 15.
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"vestiges." 9 Hence, the lower courts interpreted the Swann decision
in many different ways. 9' The courts found vestiges to include,
among other things, inadequate facilities and poor testing and teaching
methods.92
The Swann Court also held that once a constitutional violation was
found, school authorities had an affirmative duty to take all necessary
steps to convert dual public school systems into unitary ones.93 Ac-
cording to Swann, school authorities could not simply adopt race neu-
tral practices in order to bring a school into constitutional compliance,
90. Generally, vestige is defined as the visible traces or remains of something that no
longer exists. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 2547 (1993). The Supreme Court has never defined the phrase "vestiges of
past discrimination." However, the Supreme Court has recognized existing residential
segregation, quality of education, and every possible aspect of school operation as pos-
sible vestiges. See McMullen & McMullen, supra note 17, at 82-85. See generally
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495-96 (1992) (stating that "[t]he vestiges of segrega-
tion that are the concern of the law in a school case may be subtle and intangible but
nonetheless they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation be-
ing remedied," and noting that stubborn facts about the past wrongs against the black
race persist and remain in our society and in our school system); Swann, 402 U.S. at 18
(stating that the remedial responsibilities of the school board include eliminating invid-
ious racial distinctions with respect to matters such as transportation, supporting per-
sonnel, extracurricular activities, the maintenance of buildings, and the distribution of
equipment).
91. Casais, supra note 83, at 274-75.
92. See McMullen & McMullen, supra note 17, at 85-98 (noting that courts have
considered racial composition of students, student assignments, use of transportation,
residential segregation, facility and staff, school curriculum, early childhood education,
testing and grouping extracurricular activities, discipline facilities, and other factors in
determining if school authorities have taken all possible steps in eliminating the ves-
tiges of segregation).
93. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38). See also Board of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246 (1991) (noting that "unitary" is used to describe a
school system "which has been brought into compliance with the command of the
Constitution," while the term "dual" is used to denote a school system which has en-
gaged in intentional racial segregation); Casais, supra note 83, at 274-75 (noting that
"[tihe Supreme Court has made it clear that lower courts must measure the unitariness of a
school district by examining all aspects of the school system's operations-student as-
signments, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities"); id. at
278 (stating that "[s]teps must be taken to desegregate the school system and remove all
vestiges of prior de jure segregation that will otherwise continue to inflict the stigmatic
injury identified by Brown /'); Landsberg, supra note 79, at 825-826 (explaining that a
dual system is a system that is part white and part black, while a unitary system is one
that is non-racial); Celia M. Ruiz, Equity, Excellence and School Reform: A New
Paradigm For Desegregation, 101 ED. L. REP. I, 7-8 (1995) (stating that in order to
prove that its system is unitary, a district needs to show: "(I) that it has 'complied in
good faith with the desegregation decree since it was entered,' and (2) that 'the vestiges
of past discrimination [have] been eliminated to the extent practicable,"' and noting
that such rules are difficult to apply) (quoting Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249).
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but had to "make every effort to achieve unitariness." 94 Additionally,
school authorities bore the burden of showing that the remedy chosen
was not driven by iniquitous motives." While Swann placed heavy
burdens on school authorities, the decision armed the district courts
with broad equitable Rpowers to remedy past wrongs once a violation
had been established.
In addition to mandating unitary school systems, the Swann Court
"acknowledged a difference between de jure and de facto segrega-
tion. De jure segregation is segregation mandated by law.98 In
contrast, de facto segregation is segregation that occurs without legal
authority. 99 The Swann Court held that regardless of the type of seg-
regation, where a system evidences a history of statutory segregation,
school authorities bear the burden of eliminating vestiges of such dis-
crimination.'°°
94. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28. Plans that fail to consider race may also "fail to counter-
act the continuing effects of past school segregation." Id. See Casais, supra note 83, at
278 (stating that racially neutral practices occur when school authorities do not consider
race when ordering school assignments).
95. Casais, supra note 83, at 278. See also United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727,
2744 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "[w]here the State can accomplish
legitimate educational objectives through less segregative means, the courts may infer
lack of good faith; 'at least it places a heavy burden upon the [State] to explain its pref-
erence for an apparently less effective method"') (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 439). The
mathematical ratios of the racial composition of a school can be used as a guideline in
reshaping a desegregation remedy. See generally Maria A. Perugini, Comment, Board of
Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell: Protection of Local Authority or Disregard for
the Purpose of Brown v. Board of Education?, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 779, 790 (1992)
(analyzing Swann, 402 U.S. 1).
96. Casais, supra note 83, at 278. But see Christopher W. Nelson, Comment,
Missouri v. Jenkins: Judicial Taxation and the Funding of School Desegregation, 26
NEW ENG. L. REV. 529, 535 (1991) (noting that although district courts have broad re-
medial power, as a result of Swann, a district court may invoke such power only if local
school authorities fail in their affirmative duty to convert a dual school system to a uni-
tary ones).
97. Robert L. Steele, All Things Not Being Equal: The Case for Race Separate
Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 591, 604 (1993) (analyzing Swann). See also Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasizing that "the differentiating
factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation ... is purpose or
intent to segregate").
98. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 425 (Revised 6th ed. 1990).
99. Ruiz, supra note 93, at 4. For example, de facto segregation is present where a
school district discriminates not by following unconstitutional laws, but by its use of
various techniques such as the manipulation of student attendance zones, school site se-
lection, and school policies that create or maintain segregated schools throughout the
school district. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 192.
100. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16, 18. See also Ruiz, supra note 93, at 5 n.23:
"[Wie have held that where plaintiffs prove that a current condition of
segregation exists within a school district where a dual system was compelled
or authorized by statute at the time of our decision in Brown v. Board of
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The Brown I and Swann cases resulted in federal courts retaining a
tremendous amount of authority over public school systems.'0 ' Three
years after Swann, however, the Court quickly removed much of the
remedial authority it granted to the district courts. In Milliken v.
Bradley ("Milliken ,,),1 02 the Supreme Court established an absolute
limitation on the district courts' exercise of their equitable powers.
The Court held that the scope of a district court's remedial powers is
defined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. 0 3 The
Court recognized two types of violations: intradistrict and interdis-
trict.'0 4 The Court defined an intradistrict violation as a violation
which occurs within one school district,'05 and an interdistrict violation
as a violation which crosses school district boundaries.1°6
In Milliken I, the Court held that these two violations were mutually
exclusive.'0 7 As a result, where a violation occurred in only one dis-
trict, the Court refused to allow a remedy affecting a group of dis-
tricts. 0 8 Likewise, the Court stated that before a district court could
impose remedies affecting other districts, the district court had to find a
Education, (Brown I), the State automatically assumes an affirmative duty 'to
effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system."'
Id. (quoting Keyes, 413 U.S. at 200) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
101. The Brown II decision set the standard of equitable authority in fashioning
remedies. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text. The Swann decision stated
that federal district courts were to retain authority over school districts until the district
became sufficiently integrated. See supra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
102. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) [hereinafter Milliken I]. In Milliken
1, the district court attempted to desegregate the Detroit school system by imposing de-
segregation orders on the Detroit school system and outlying suburban districts. Id. at
722-36.
103. Id. at 744 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 16).
104. See id. at 741-47 (addressing for the first time the validity of a remedy mandat-
ing cross-district or interdistrict consolidation to remedy a condition of segregation
found to exist in only one district). The Milliken I Court found that an interdistrict rem-
edy may be appropriate when the racially discriminating acts of one district cause segre-
gation in adjoining districts. Id. at 745.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Court stated that "without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict ef-
fect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy." Id.
Interdistrict remedies are appropriate, however, where a constitutional violation directly
causes interdistrict segregation. Id. The Court reasoned that desegregation remedies are
designed, as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminating conduct to the po-
sition they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct. Id. at 746. Once a dis-
trict court finds a constitutional violation, the court need only tailor "the scope of the
remedy" to fit "the nature and extent of the constitutional violation." Id. at 744.
730 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 27
constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant
effect in another."°
In a subsequent case, the Court distinguished Milliken I and held
that in some instances district courts have the judicial authority to im-
pose remedies that affect districts that have not participated in constitu-
tional violations."0 This remedial authority should exist, the Court
held, so long as decrees have no segregative effect and are not binding
on districts free from violations."'I
These seemingly conflicting decisions left open the question of
when a court may look beyond the boundaries of a school district
found to be unconstitutionally segregating students and impose a rem-
edy affecting other districts." 2 Consequently, in 1977, the Supreme
Court attempted to define in more detail the scope of the district courts'
remedial power. After examining previous decisions, the Court, in
Milliken v. Bradley ("Milliken IF,), 1 3 constructed a three-part test
formulated to guide courts in exercising their remedial authority."14
First, the remedy specified in the decree must be related to the viola-
tion. "5 Second, the decree must be remedial in nature, and narrowly
109. Id. at 744-45. The Court explained that "an interdistrict remedy might be in or-
der where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial
segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn
on the basis of race." Id. at 745. See also Casais, supra note 83, at 265 (noting that the
Court limited the remedy that may be imposed to only those school districts where seg-
regation has been shown and "prohibited district courts from implementing remedies
calling for the perpetual balancing of student assignments at particular levels").
110. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 296 (1973). The Gautreaux case is a public
housing case as opposed to a school desegregation case. Nevertheless, Gautreaux ana-
lyzed the scope of the federal courts' authority to fashion remedies in segregation cases
in general. Id. at 294-95.
I11. Id. The Gautreaux Court explained that the Milliken I decision stood for the
proposition that "there had to be an interdistrict violation or effect before a federal court
could order the crossing of district boundary lines." Id. at 296. The Court reasoned that
the Milliken I Court found the district court's desegregation order impermissible "not
because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the
violation occurred," but rather because the order "contemplated a judicial decree restruc-
turing the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any con-
stitutional violation." Id.
112. Compare id. at 296 (allowing the district court to fashion a remedy that affected
districts that had not participated in a constitutional violation) with Milliken I, 418
U.S. at 745 (refusing to allow the district court to impose remedies that affected suburban
school district that did not participate in constitutional segregation violations).
113. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken I1].
114. Id. at 280-81. See supra notes 59-111 and accompanying text for a discussion
of earlier opinions on which the Milliken 11 Court relied.
115. Id. at 280. The Milliken II Court derived this factor from the Court's holding in
Swann. The Milliken 1I Court, like the Swann Court, refused to give the district courts
unlimited power in fashioning remedies. Id. at 281-82. The Milliken I1 Court noted that
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designed to restore victims of segregation to the position they would
have occupied if such discriminating behavior had never existed." '
6
Third, federal courts must consider the interest of state and local au-
thorities in managing their own affairs."7
Under Milliken II, the Court gave remedial and compensatory edu-
cation programs new prominence as a desegregation remedy." 8
Moreover, the focus on remedies shifted from the racial population of
schools to improving educational performance. 9 The Milliken II de-
"the well-settled principle that the nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined
by the violation means simply that federal court decrees must directly address and relate
to the constitutional violation itself." Id. Notably, the federal courts exceed their juris-
diction if their decree is aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate the
Constitution, does not flow from such a violation, or is imposed on "governmental
units that were neither involved in nor affected by" segregation. Id. at 282 (citing
Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976) and Milliken I, 418 U.S.
717, 744-45 (1974)).
116. Id. at 280. See also Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746 (holding that, because the dis-
parate treatment of white and black students occurred only within the Detroit school sys-
tem, the district court did not possess the authority to issue decrees requiring cross-dis-
trict transportation of students). Hence, district courts will exceed their remedial author-
ity if they fashion remedies for a condition that does not violate the Constitution or
impose remedies upon governmental units not involved in or affected by the constitu-
tional violation. Milliken I, 433 U.S. at 282.
117. Milliken II, 433 U.S at 280-81. Milliken I1 reiterated the principle that district
courts are to oversee school systems until past wrongs are remedied to the extent practi-
cable. Id. at 281.
I 1 8. Chip Jones, Freeman v. Pitts: Congress Can (and Should?) Limit Federal Court
Jurisdiction in School Desegregation Cases, 47 SMU L. REV. 1889, 1905 (1994)
(analyzing Milliken II). After Milliken II, the district courts began to shift their focus
from white flight to educational programs. Id. at 1905-06.
In addition to constructing a clear test as a guide to the federal courts, Milliken II rec-
ognized that, in some instances, a remedy does not have to be directly related to a con-
stitutional violation, but needs only to address the consequences of the constitutional
violation. See Milliken 1I, 433 U.S. at 287 (noting that, even though the desegregation
plan chosen was not particular to race, the decree was aptly tailored to remedy the conse-
quences of the constitutional violation); Ruiz, supra note 93, at 12 (stating that in
Milliken 11 the Court's rationale was that: "l) 'the need for educational components
flowed directly from constitutional violations by officials;' 2) 'imbalanced student as-
signments could 'manifest and breed other inequalities' and; 3) 'pupil assignment alone
does not automatically remedy the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation;
the consequences linger and can be dealt with only by independent measures'") (quoting
Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 282, 283) (emphasis added).
1 19. Jones, supra note 118, at 1905-06. See also Ruiz, supra note 93, at 12, which
states that:
[S]ince Milliken I1, courts have considered the "consequences of the constitu-
tional violations" to require remedial or compensatory programs in both
strictly academic subjects such as reading and in "human relations," including
in service training and special counseling to assist students, parents, and fac-
ulty [to] deal with "the various pressures which arise as a result of desegrega-
tion."
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cision broadened the scope of the district courts' power. 20 The deci-
sion did not discuss, however, the point at which districts courts are to
determine that segregation no longer exists, such that they must relin-
quish their power to local authorities.'
2
'
E. Restoring the Power over the Schools to School Authorities
In Freeman v. Pitts,'22 the Supreme Court established guidelines to
assist federal courts in determining how they should relinquish their
authority to school officials.' 2' The Court first noted that district
courts did not have to relinquish immediately all of their authority,
24
and could instead elect to order an incremental or partial withdrawal of
court supervision.
25
The Freeman Court next noted that district courts should exercise
discretion when determining whether they should relinquish their au-
thority. 126 The Court suggested that district courts consider whether
the school district has fully complied with the original desegregation
decree, whether retention of judicial control is necessary to achieve
compliance with the decree in other areas, and whether the school dis-
trict has demonstrated a good faith commitment to the court's decree
and to those provisions of the law and constitution originally vio-
lated. 2 7
Id. (quoting Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 770-771 (3d Cir. 1978)).
120. Jones, supra note 118, at 1905.
121. Id.
122. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
123. Id. at 489-92. The Freeman Court noted that ."local autonomy of school dis-
tricts is a vital national tradition."' Id. at 490 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977)). The Court explained that state entities become
directly responsible and accountable for discrimination and racial hostility within the
school system. See also Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280-81 (stating that the federal courts,
in devising a remedy, must take into account the interests of state and local authorities
in managing their own affairs with the Constitution).
124. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490-91. A district court may decide not to return full con-
trol of the school to school authorities where it finds that a school system is in compli-
ance only in some areas of the court's supervised desegregation plan. Id. at 491. Or, a
district court may decide to return control to school authorities only in the areas of com-
pliance. Id.
125. Id. at 491. See infra part IV.B for the application of Freeman to a recent case;
see also Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-250 (1991) (holding that "[t]he
District Court should address itself to whether the Board had complied in good faith with
the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimi-
nation had been eliminated to the extent practicable").
126. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491.
127. Id. Moreover, the elements of a unitary system-faculty staff, transportation,
and extra curricular activities-set forth in Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435
(1968), need not be rigidly viewed. Id. at 492-93.
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Despite this potential for school officials to regain authority, the
Court also noted that district courts may nonetheless reassert their
control in the face of new constitutional violations. 28 Thus, the Free-
man Court generally discussed the district courts' discretion to retain
or relinquish authority over school districts. 29 In application, how-
ever, the Freeman decision provided the lower federal courts with little
guidance in determining when to relinquish their authority. 30 This
void required the Supreme Court to clarify the point at which it be-
comes appropriate for the courts to restore authority to local offi-
cials. 3 '
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Facts and the Lower Courts' Opinions in Jenkins
In 1977, students of the Kansas City Missouri School District (the
"School District"), brought suit against the State of Missouri, the
School District, and other defendants. 3 2 The plaintiffs alleged that
Missouri and others generated and maintained racial segregation in the
schools.133 The School District brought a cross claim against Missouri
In Freeman, the Court required school systems seeking release from judicial control to
implement plans which would eradicate the vestiges of past discrimination and to affir-
matively commit to comply with remedial decrees in good faith. Id. at 491. "A history
of good-faith compliance is evidence that any current racial imbalance is not the product
of a new de jure violation and enables the district court to accept the school board's rep-
resentation that it has accepted the principle of racial equality and will not suffer inten-
tional discrimination in the future." Id. at 498. A history of good faith demonstrates
that school authorities are headed towards permanent compliance with the desegregation
decree. Landsberg, supra note 79, at 852. See also Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 321
(1st Cir. 1987) (explaining that "[a] finding of good faith reduces the possibility that a
school system's compliance with court orders is but a temporary constitutional ritual").
Conversely, a lack of good faith will support continued intervention by district courts.
Freeman, 503 U.S. at 499.
128. Federal courts have power to deal with future problems upon a showing that ei-
ther school authorities or some other state agency has deliberately attempted to alter the
racial composition of the schools. Id. at 492.
129. Id. at 491-92.
130. See Casais, supra note 83, at 295 (pointing out this ambiguity).
131. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
132. Id. at 2042. The original plaintiffs in the suit included the School District, the
school board, and the children of two school board members. Id. The district court,
however, realigned the School District as a nominal defendant, and present and future
School District students were certified as a class of plaintiffs. Id. The other defendants
included some surrounding suburban school districts and federal agencies. Id.
133. Id. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the State of Missouri, surrounding
school districts, and various federal agencies caused racial segregation in the School
District. Id. Subsequently, the claims against surrounding suburban school districts and
the federal defendants were dismissed. Id.
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for its failure to abolish the vestiges of its prior segregated school sys-
tem. 34 After lengthy litigation, the federal district court found both
Missouri and the School District liable for an intradistrict violation.
35
The district court determined that, prior to 1954, "Missouri mandated
segregated schools for black and white children." 36 In addition, the
district court found that the State and the School District failed to sat-
isfy their affirmative obligation to eliminate the vestiges of past State-
imposed segregation. 3
7
Finding that the State of Missouri and the School District had failed
to convert the dual school system to a unitary one, the district court is-
sued its first remedial order in June of 1985.138 This order's primary
goal was the elimination of all vestiges of state-imposed segrega-
tion. 139 The district court determined that segregation "caused a sys-
temwide reduction in student achievement in the [school district],""
and identified twenty-five schools within the school district that had
enrollment levels of ninety percent or more black students.' 4' The
134. Id.
135. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1503 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (finding that
the State and School District failed to eliminate the vestiges of previous suggested
school systems). Specifically, the district court found that the State and the School
District "operated a segregated school system within the [School District]." Jenkins,
115 S. Ct. at 2042. See also Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1503 ("In the past the state has
taken positive actions which were discriminatory against blacks."). The district court
also noted that:
[The State] mandated separate schools for blacks and whites; it established
separate institutions for teaching black school teachers; it established and
maintained a separate institution for higher education for blacks at Lincoln
University, it provided that school boards in any town, city or consolidated
school district could establish separate libraries, public parks and playgrounds
for blacks and whites . . .; it made it a crime for a person 1/8 Negro blood to
marry a white person . . . ; and its courts enforced racially restrictive
covenants.
Id.
136. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042 (quoting Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1490, which
took judicial notice of the fact that, before 1954, Missouri mandated segregated school
systems for blacks and whites).
137. Id. (citing Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1504). Having created a dual system, the
School District and the State of Missouri had, and continue to have, an obligation to
dismantle that system. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1505. The School District and
Missouri failed to comply with that constitutional obligation. Id.
138. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 657
(8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987) (implementing a desegregation plan).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 24.
1 41. Id. at 33. The court relied on testimony that, according to the Iowa Test of Basic
Skills, of the 50 schools in the District, only a small number performed at or above the
national average in reading and mathematics. Id. at 24. Testimony revealed that "this
situation is correctable and that the schools in the [District], when provided with ade-
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district court ordered the School District to restore its schools to the
highest classification awarded by the Missouri Department of
Elementary and Secondary Education, 42 and to reduce the student-to-
teacher ratio. 43 The district court also ordered the creation of pro-
grams geared towards the expansion of educational opportunities for
all the students in the school district. 44 The district court "imple-
mented a state-funded effective schools program that consisted of sub-
stantial yearly cash grants to each of the schools within the [school
district]." 45
In a subsequent order issued in November of 1986, the district court
held Missouri and the School District responsible for funding a capital
improvement plan and comprehensive magnet school program."4 The
quate resources, sufficient staff development, and proper teaching methods, can attain
educational achievement results more in keeping with the national norms." Id. Even
though the district court found a lower level of school achievement, it made "no particu-
larized findings regarding the extent that student achievement had been reduced or what
portion of that reduction was attributable to segregation." Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042.
142. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 26. The Missouri State Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education ("DESE") conducts yearly evaluations of schools in order to pro-
vide guidance and support in developing quality education. Id. DESE classifies schools
according to the quality of the schools' educational programs and the merit of the pro-
grams. Id. In addition, DESE classifies according to the services offered by the schools
such as instructor qualifications, class size, and instructional information. Id. AAA, the
highest classification, "communicates to the public that a school system quantitatively
and qualitatively has the resources necessary to provide minimum basic education to its
students." Id. In order to achieve AAA classification an elementary school must have 13
certified librarians; teachers are to devote no more than 310 minutes a day teaching, ex-
cept for librarians and guidance counselors, who may devote 360 minutes a day to teach-
ing; art and music must be scheduled and taught at least 60 minutes a week; and there
should be one counselor for every 1500 students. Id. at 26-28.
143. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2042-43. The district court found that "achieving reduced
class size is an essential part of any plan to remedy the vestiges of segregation."
Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 29. The district court reasoned that reduction in class size guar-
antees individual attention and instruction, as well as attracting non-minority students.
Id.
144. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2043. For example, the district court ordered full-day
kindergarten, expanded summer school, both before-school and after-school tutoring,
and an early childhood development program. Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 30-33.
145. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2043. "Under the 'effective schools' program, the State
was required to fund programs at the 25 racially identifiable schools as well as the 43
other schools within the [District]." Id. In an effort to continue improving educational
programs, the district court also required the School District to combat deterioration by
improving the District's facilities. Id. at 2044. The district court found it irrelevant that
the conditions of the facilities could not be linked to unlawful segregation. Id. The
court primarily focused on remedying the vestiges of segregation and maintaining
schools that would attract non-minorities. Id.
146. Id. at 2043. The district court's plan provided that "every senior high school,
every middle school, and one-half of the elementary schools" would be converted to a
magnet school. Id. A magnet school is a school which offers high-quality and highly
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district court believed that a-magnet school program would provide a
better educational environment and greater educational opportuni-
ties. 1 47 These better opportunities could, in turn, attract non-minority
students, who had abandoned or avoided the School District, from
private schools, as well as draw other non-minorities from the sub-
urbs. 1 48 Additionally, as part of the desegregation plan for the School
District, the district court, in 1987, ordered salary assistance for vir-
tually all instructional and non-instructional employees.' 49
As a result of the district court's plan, the School District attempted
to comply with the orders, and during the 1987-1988 school year, the
State eventually awarded the School District an "AAA" rating, the
highest classification, and found that the School District had in fact
greatly exceeded the highest requirements.150 By the 1988-1989
school year, the School District had implemented each of the district
court's orders. 51
Missouri challenged the district court's orders requiring it to fund
salary increases and instructing it to fund remedial quality education
programs. 52 The State argued that any order requiring it to fund
salary increases went beyond the authority of the district court. 5 3 In
specialized curriculums in addition to the basic curriculum. Stell v. Board of Pub. Educ.,
724 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (S.D. Ga. 1988). Magnet schools aid school desegregation
and are usually designed to attract outside students on a voluntary basis from all parts of
a school district without manipulating attendance zones. Id.
147. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2043. The district court believed that an integrated envi-
ronment would benefit all of the District students. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 2044. Initially, the district court ordered salary increases only for teach-
ers. Id. However, the district court later ordered salary assistance f6r almost all the
School District employees, both instructional and non-instructional. Id. Such salary
increases have cost the District and Missouri over $200 million. Id.
150. Id. at 2043. At a May 1992 hearing, Dr. Terrance Steward of the Missouri
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education testified that "'Kansas City School
District [now] exceeds what's available in all the suburban school districts in almost ev-
ery area of classification."' Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 401 (8th Cir.
1994) (Beam, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing) (quoting Joint Appendix A, Vol. V
at 1012, Jenkins v. Missouri, II F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993) (Nos. 90-2238, 91-3634, 92-
3194, 92-3200), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)), rev'd sub nom. Jenkins v. Missouri,
115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
1 51. Jenkins by Agyei, 19 F.3d at 401 (Beam, J., dissenting from denial of rehear-
ing).
152. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045. Missouri argued that under Freeman, it was no
longer required to fund programs because "it had achieved partial unitary status," and
therefore the district court was required to relieve it from funding educational programs.
Id. at 2045. The quality education programs included magnet schools and summer
schools. Id. at 2043. See supra notes 122-131 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Freeman.
153. Id. at 2047. See also Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 13 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th
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particular, the State challenged the order requiring them to increase the
salaries of non-teacher personnel, including maintenance workers and
cooks. "4
The district court found no support for Missouri's challenges and
reasoned that the goal of higher quality education warranted the salary
increase. 5 5 Moreover, the district court determined that in order to
eliminate the vestiges of segregation, the School District must improve
its desegregative attractiveness. 56 The district court, however, failed
to specifically address Missouri's position that the School District had
achieved partial unitariness in accordance with Freeman.157 Neverthe-
less, the district court ordered Missouri to continue funding the magnet
programs, as well as the salary increases.5
8
Cir. 1993) (rejecting Missouri's argument that "low teacher salaries do not flow from
any earlier constitutional violations by the State"), rev'd sub nom. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct.
at 2038. Missouri argued such an order violates Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), which requires remedial action to correct the vestiges
of prior segregation and no more. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048 (citing Milliken 1, 433
U.S. at 267, and Swann, 402 U.S. at 1).
154. Jenkins by Agyei, 13 F.3d at 1172, 1174. The district court believed that the
salary increases for the School District's personnel constituted an essential component
of its desegregation orders. Id. at 1172. The district court reasoned that "high quality
teachers, administrators and staff must be hired to improve the desegregative attractive-
ness" of the School District. Id.
155. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045. "'[H]igh quality personnel are necessary not only
to implement specialized desegregation programs intended to "improve educational op-
portunities and reduce racial isolation," but also to "ensure that there is no diminution in
the quality of its regular academic program."' Id. (citations omitted).
156. Id. The district court focused primarily on making the School District more at-
tractive in hopes of stopping white flight. Id.
157. Id. "The District court did not address the State's Freeman argument." Id. The
Eighth Circuit stated:
"The [district] [c]ourt's goal was to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri,
School District to the maximum degree possible, and all these other matters
were elements to be used to try to integrate Kansas City, Missouri schools so
the goal is integration. That's the goal. And a high standard of quality educa-
tion. The magnet schools, the summer school programs are tied to that goal,
and until such times as that goal has been reached, then we have not reached
the goal .. . . The goal is to integrate the Kansas City, Missouri, School dis-
trict."
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045-46 (quoting Jenkins by Agyei, II F.3d at 761). Under
Freeman, a district court should consider whether a school district has fully complied
with the desegregation order; whether retention of judicial control is necessary; and
whether the school district acted in good faith. See supra part II.E.
1 58. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2045. The district court reasoned that because its goal
was to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination and, in so doing, improve the de-
segregative attractiveness of the District, its order requiring Missouri to fund salary in-
creases would stand. Id. In addition, the district court mandated that Missouri continue
funding the quality education programs for the 1992-1993 school year, even though the
program did not confront the State's argument. Id.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion,
stating that the district court did not err in ordering salary increases or
in declining to give a reason for its decision regarding funding of qual-
ity educational programs.'59 The court determined that Missouri
achieved little success in remedying the harms of segregation. 60 The
court determined that, at most, Missouri had hardly begun to eliminate
the vestiges of past discrimination.' 6
The Eighth Circuit also rejected Missouri's unitary status argu-
ment. 62 The court ruled that the State's obligation was to integrate the
District. 63 The magnet schools, the summer school programs, and
159. Jenkins by Agyei, I I F.3d at 761. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the district
court needed only to rule on the ultimate facts necessary to reach a decision in the case
and did not have to make specific findings on all facts. Id. The court also justified the
district court's failure to give specific reasons for its ruling. Id. The Eighth Circuit rea-
soned that the district court indirectly addressed Missouri's Freeman argument. Id. The
court derived this reasoning from the district court's order, which anticipated a gradual
withdrawal of the district court's control. Id. "[T]he court's order indicated that the
magnet school plan had been substantially successful, that future areas for improvement
still existed, and the court was looking forward to the day when a gradual phase-out
would be considered." Id. at 762.
1 60. Id. at 765. "[T]he State is [not] entitled to be released upon accomplishment of
any particular objective without also considering whether retention of judicial control
was necessary or practicable ...." Id.
161. Id. The Eighth Circuit also defined those vestiges as white flight and decreased
student achievement. Id. at 764. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit noted that:
The district court found that segregation in [the School District] caused depar-
ture of the whites in the system to private schools and to the suburbs. During
the years between Brown I and trial, the enrollment of [the School District]
shifted from predominately white to predominately black. In the 1958-59
school year, blacks constituted 22.5% of [the School District] enrollment, but
by 1983-84 enrollment was 67.7% black and white enrollment had dropped
80% . . . . [B]ut the district court found in 1984 that [the School District] had
still not completely dismantled the dual system.
Id. at 764. Therefore, the court reasoned that the remedy demanded not only compensa-
tion to victims but also reversal of white flight through superior educational opportuni-
ties. Jenkins by Agyei, 13 F.3d at 1172 (affirming the District Court's June 30, 1993
and July 30, 1993 orders). The court explained the remedy:
The goals of the remedial programs were: (I) to compensate the victims by
improving the education given them; (2) to enhance the programs so as to re-
verse the white flight pattern, winning back white students from private and
suburban schools, and thus ending the racial isolation of the victims; and (3)
to use the magnet schools as a way of bringing about voluntary redistribution
of children within the [School District] itself.
Jenkins by Agyei, I I F.3d at 764.
162. Jenkins by Agyei, II F.3d at 764-65. The court reasoned that it must consider
the constitutional injury, the methods selected to remedy that injury, the goals of the
remedy, and the success achieved by the remedy in eliminating the effects of segrega-
tion, in order to determine if the District achieved partial unitary status. Id. The injury
is the vestiges of the once state-mandated dual school system. Id.
163. Id. at 767. "The goals of the remedial programs are to improve the educational
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other programs all related to that obligation. 64 Because Missouri
failed to satisfy this obligation, the court refused to consider the State's
other arguments. 6' The court found that even though Missouri
achieved some improvement, the School District did not reach its
maximum potential because the District's students' scores fell at or
below the national norms. 66
The State then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court.' 67 The
Court granted the petition in order to address two questions: (1)
whether the district court went beyond its remedial authority when it
granted salary increases to virtually all instructional and non-instruc-
tional employees; and (2) whether the district court properly relied
upon student achievement scores when it declined to find that Missouri
had achieved partial unitary status regarding the quality education pro-
grams. 16
8
B. The Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
In Missouri v. Jenkins,169 the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Eighth Circuit and reversed the district court's order requiring
Missouri to fund salary increases and quality education programs. 70
lot of the victims of unconstitutional segregation, to regain some portion of the white
students who have fled the District and retain those that are still there ..... Id.
164. Id. at 768.
165. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2046.
166. Id. Because the students had failed to achieve the national norms, the court rea-
soned that the vestiges of segregation had not been eliminated to the greatest extent
practicable. Id. The district court stated that, with respect to quality education:
[The] implementation of programs in and of itself is not sufficient. The test,
after all, is whether the vestiges of segregation, here the systemwide reduction
in student achievement, have been eliminated to the greatest extent practica-
ble. The success of quality education programs must be measured by their ef-
fect on the student, particularly those who have been victims of segregation.
Jenkins by Agyei, II F.3d at 765-66.
167. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994).
168. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2046. When this case was previously before the Supreme
Court, the Court held that the judiciary could impose relief to ameliorate unconstitu-
tional conditions in education, penitentiaries, housing, and other public policy areas,
and that the judiciary could require local officials to increase taxes needed for financing
relief. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990). See generally Theodore M. Shaw,
Missouri v. Jenkins: Are We Really a Desegregated Society?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 57,
59-60 (1992) (discussing whether society has really changed its attitude towards segre-
gated schools since Brown 1).
169. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
170. Id. at 2056. The Supreme Court stated: "The District Court's pursuit of the goal
of 'desegregative attractiveness' results in so many imponderables and is so far removed
from the task of eliminating the racial identifiability of the schools within the [School
District] that we believe it is beyond the admittedly broad discretion of the District
Court." Id. at 2055. The Court found the district court remedy, desegregative attractive-
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The Court held that the district court went beyond its remedial powers
when it fashioned a novel remedy for the School District,' 7' and re-
manded the case back to that court, ordering the district court to con-
centrate on restoring control of the School District to the State. 72
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the Court's opinion by stating that
the Court must first analyze the permissible scope of the district court's
remedial power, an issue not presented to the Court for review. 7 3 The
Court rejected the parties' argument that, as it was not a question pre-
sented to the Court for review, the parties did not have proper notice of
the issue. 74 The Court defined the questions presented for review to
include a challenge of the scope of the district court's remedial author-
ity. 75 In deciding this issue, the Supreme Court ultimately considered
ness, to be too far removed to adequately address the vestiges of past State mandated seg-
regation. Id. at 2047-56.
1 7 1. Id. at 2054. The Court held that the goal of desegregative attractiveness, to be
achieved through salary increases and indefinite funding of quality educational pro-
grams, was not narrowly tailored to address the past segregation in the School District.
Id.
172. Id. at 2056. On remand, the Court ordered the district court to "apply ... [the]
three-part test from Freeman v. Pitts," id. at 2055; "consider that many goals of its qual-
ity education plan already have been attained," id. at 2056; and "bear in mind that its end
purpose is not only 'to remedy the violation' to the extent practicable, but also 'to re-
store state and local authorities to the control of a school-system that is operating in
compliance with the Constitution."' Id. (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489
(1992)).
173. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2047. The Court stated that:
Proper analysis of the District Court's orders challenged here, then, must rest
upon their serving as proper means to the end of restoring the victims of dis-
criminating conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence
of that conduct . . . "and control of a school system that is operating in com-
pliance with the Constitution."
Id. at 2049 (quoting Freeman,'503 U.S. at 489).
174. Id. at 2047. The Court stated that its prior decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495
U.S. 33, 53 (1990), should have put all parties on notice that the Court had not affirmed
the validity of the district court's remedy, and that "at least four Justices of the Court
questioned that remedy." Id.
175. Id. "An analysis of the permissible scope of the District Court's remedial au-
thority is necessary for a proper determination of whether the order of salary increases is
beyond the District court's remedial authority . . .and thus, it is an issue subsidiary to
our ultimate inquiry." Id.
The Court determined that consideration of the district court's remedial authority was
essential to correct disposition of the issues presented. Id. The Court also reasoned that
the district court was aware that Missouri challenged its remedial authority and had ample
opportunity to brief the issue. Id. Missouri had consistently maintained that the Court
should not approve the district court's order requiring Missouri to fund salary increases
because it impermissibly extends the scope of the district court's remedial authority. Id.
at 2048. See also Jenkins by Agyei, II F.3d at 766 ("The State argues first that the
salary increase remedy sought exceeded that necessary to remedy the constitutional vio-
lations, and alternatively, that if the district court had lawful authority to impose the in-
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whether the district court's orders properly "'restore[d] the victims of
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct.
'
,11
In considering the scope of the district court's remedial authority,
the Court found no constitutional violation affecting more than one
school district.'77 The Court instead found that the violation occurred
within a single district.'7 8 The Court explained that the goal of the
district court, non-minority attractiveness, constituted a remedy that
would improperly affect districts which did not participate in the viola-
tion.1
79
Consequently, Missouri argued that the district court also exceeded
its remedial authority when it ordered salary increases to achieve an
interdistrict goal. 80 The Court agreed with the State's argument after
examining the district court's goal of crafting the School District into
one "equal to or superior to the surrounding" suburban school dis-
tricts.1' The Court found that salary increases to employees, instruc-
tional employees or otherwise, would make the School District more
attractive and contribute to the impermissible goal of inducing non-mi-
norities students from outside the School District to enroll in schools
within the District.8 2 The Court stated that the district court should
creases, it abused its discretion in doing so ... .
176. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2049 (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746).
177. Id. at 2050. "[T]he District Court has found, and the Court of Appeals has af-
firmed, that this case involved no interdistrict constitutional violation that would sup-
port interdistrict relief." Id. See also Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 37, n.3 (stating that the dis-
trict court found that "none of the alleged discriminatory actions had resulted in linger-
ing interdistrict effects and so dismissed the suburban school districts as and denied in-
terdistrict relief"); and id. at 76 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (stating that "there was no interdistrict constitutional violation that would sup-
port mandatory interdistrict relief").
178. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text
(discussing interdistrict and intradistrict violations).
179. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052. The Court explained that an interdistrict violation
is a violation that causes segregation between adjoining districts: "The District Court's
pursuit of 'desegregative attractiveness' is beyond the scope of its broad remedial au-
thority." Id.
180. Id. at 2049. "The State argues that the order approving salary increases is be-
yond the District Court's authority because it was crafted to serve an 'interdistrict goal,'
in spite of the fact that the constitutional violation in this case is 'intradistrict' in na-
ture."' Id.
181. Id. at 2050.
182. Id. at 2054. The Court found that instead of focusing on attracting non-minori-
ties, the district court should have designed a remedial plan that would redistribute the
students within the District in order to eliminate racially identifiable schools within the
District. Id. at 2051. The remedy imposed by the district court was too far removed from
the problem of racially identifiable schools in the School District. Id.
1996]
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have focused on eliminating, to the extent practicable, the vestiges of
prior de jure segregation within the District, not on drawing non-mi-
norities from outside the district.'83
The Court next considered whether the district court exceeded its
remedial power when it crafted the School District into a "magnet"
school district. 84 The Court found the district court's magnet school
program to be impermissible because it focused primarily on attracting
non-minorities from outside the District.'85 The Court reasoned that
the district court created a magnet school program to achieve the goal
of transferring non-minority students from outside districts to the vio-
lators' District.'8 6
The Court also reviewed the propriety of the district court's order
requiring continued funding for quality education programs.'8 7 The
Court agreed with the State's argument that the required funding of
such programs until students meet national norms is unjustified.88
The Court reasoned that comparing the scores of School District stu-
183. Id. at 2050-51. The Court found that the School District was designed to attract
non-minority students, not to end racial identification within the School District. Id.
184. Id. at 2051-52. The Court noted that in the district court's pursuit of
"desegregative attractiveness," it converted "every senior high school, every middle
school, and one-half of the elementary schools .. . into 'magnet' schools." Id. at 2051.
The Court questioned the reasonableness of such an order. Id.
185. Id. See also Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 38 (restating the district court order that
"'because of restrictions on this court's remedial powers in restructuring the operations
of local and state government entities,' any mandatory plan which would go beyond the
boundary lines of . . . [the School District] goes far beyond the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation this Court found existed") (quoting its Jan. 25, 1985 order).
186. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052 ("IT]he [d]istrict [c]ourt has done just that: created a
magnet district . . . in order to serve the interdistrict goal of attracting nonminority stu-
dents from the surrounding [suburban school districts] and redistributing them within the
[School District].").
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor distinguished Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976), which appeared to advocate the use of broad judicial remedies to eliminate segre-
gation. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2058 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See supra notes 110-
11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gautreaux. Justice O'Connor explained
that Gautreaux involved different facts and therefore was not controlling. Jenkins, 115
S. Ct. at 2058 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Gautreaux case involved remedies im-
posed upon a federal agency and did not involve stable geographical areas. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. at 292 n.9. See also supra part II.D (explaining post-Brown I analysis of
school desegregation plans). Nonetheless, the Jenkins Court stated that its holding was
consistent with Gautreaux, in that Gautreaux did not obligate the district court to subject
a constitutional violator to measures beyond the geographical boundaries of its viola-
tion. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2053. "Our decision today is fully consistent with
Gautreaux. A district court seeking to remedy an intradistrict violation that has not
'directly caused' significant interdistrict effects, (citation omitted), exceeds its remedial
authority if it orders a remedy within an interdistrict purpose." Id.
187. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
188. Id.
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dents to national norms was not an appropriate test to determine
whether the District had become sufficiently desegregated. 8 9 The
Court noted that improved test scores are not necessarily required for
Missouri to achieve "partial unitary status''9g in regard to the quality
education programs.' 9' The Court further suggested that the district
court no longer rely on this factor.
92
Because the Supreme Court disagreed with the district court orders,
the Court ordered the district court to reconsider whether the State had
sufficiently desegregated its school districts. 93 The Court further or-
dered the district court to remember that its end purpose was to restore
the control of the school system to local authorities."9
C. The Concurring Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority opinion in substance. In
a separate concurring opinion, she addressed the scope of the federal
courts' remedial power in the context of desegregation cases and ex-
plained how the Court's decision in Jenkins remained consistent with
its prior decisions."
First, Justice O'Connor explained that Hills v. Gautreaux919 did not
invalidate the predicates of Milliken I, requiring district courts to first
find a segregative effect before implementing remedies that affect
189. Id. at 2056. "Insistence upon academic goals unrelated to the effects of legal
segregation unwarrantably postpones the day when the [School District] will be able to
operate on its own." Id. The Court noted that external factors beyond the control of the
School District will affect student achievement. Id.
190. Id. at 2055. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487 (1992) ("'[C]ourts have
used the term 'dual' to denote a school system which has engaged in intentional segrega-
tion of students by race, and 'unitary' to describe a school system which has been
brought into compliance with the command of the Constitution."') (quoting Board of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245-46 (1991)).
191. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
192. Id. at 2055-56. The Court recommended that the court limit or dispense with its
reliance on the factor of increased educational achievement and consider goals already
obtained. Id. at 2056. In this case, the Court noted that Missouri attained many of the
goals of the district court's quality education plan. Id. For example, the Court noted that
the District provided "facilities and opportunities not available anywhere else in the
country." Id. Moreover, the School District received an AAA rating for the previous
eight years. Id.
193. Id. at 2055. See also Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246 (stating that the school board is
entitled to a precise statement of its obligations under a desegregation decree).
194. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056 (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489).
195. Id. at 2057 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
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schools outside the boundaries of a violating district. 97 Next, Justice
O'Connor refuted the argument that the district court in Jenkins un-
derstood "interdistrict remedy" to be something other than that defined
in Milliken Lt198 Under this reasoning, Justice O'Connor rejected the
notion that Milliken I would require an interdistrict remedy so long as
there are significant effects, segregative or otherwise, in non-violating
districts.' 99 In this case, surrounding districts had-not participated in
segregation but would have been affected by the district court or-
ders.200
Finally, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority opinion that the
district court centered its orders around the goals of desegregative at-
tractiveness and reversal of white flight.20' She found these goals to
be impermissible in light of the scope of the school's constitutional
violation.0 2 Justice O'Connor suggested that the district court stop
providing "palliatives for societal ills" and focus on curing constitu-
tional violations.0 3
197. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
stated that "Gautreaux in no way contravenes the underlying principle that the scope of
desegregation remedies, even those that are solely intradistrict, is 'determined by the na-
ture and extent of the constitutional violation."' Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744). Justice O'Connor explained that Gautreaux may not have
involved an interdistrict remedy as the term is meant in Milliken L Id. at 2058
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She also argued that "Gautreaux [does not] dispense[] with
the predicates of Milliken L" Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See.also Jenkins by Agyei
v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 672 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that "Milliken and [Gautreaux]
make clear that we may grant interdistrict relief only to remedy a constitutional viola-
tion committed by the [suburban school districts], or to remedy an interdistrict effect in
the [suburban school districts)' caused by a constitutional violation in [the District]"),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987).
198. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2059 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
noted that the district court found and the court of appeals affirmed that there was no con-
stitutional violation outside the District and that there were no interdistrict segregative
effects. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Jenkins by Agyei, 807 F.2d at 672
(stating that the court found no significant segregative effects).
199. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct at 2059 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
argued that interdistrict remedies were appropriate only where the effects beyond the dis-
trict in question were segregative. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
201. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
202. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). While Justice O'Connor found white flight to be
an unfortunate regional demographic trend, she found that such a remedy went "beyond
the nature and scope of the constitutional violation." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
She noted that the elimination of discrimination inherent in the dual school systems
"are not readily corrected by judicial intervention, but are best addressed by the represen-
tative branches; time and again, we have recognized the ample authority legislatures
possess to combat racial injustice." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated: "The unfortu-
nate fact of racial imbalance and bias in our society, however pervasive or invidious,
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2. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas identified two separate
problems with the district court's remedy. He asserted that: (1) the
district court mistakenly operated under the theory "that black students
suffer an unspecified psychological harm from segregation that retards
their mental and educational development;" 2° and (2) the federal courts
have exercised "virtually unlimited equitable powers" to remedy al-
leged constitutional violations.25
First, Justice Thomas reasoned that the district court inferred an on-
going constitutional violation based upon evidence of pre- 1954 de jure
segregation of the School District and present de facto segregation.2°
Justice Thomas noted, however, that such evidence was insufficient to
prove continued segregation.0 7 Justice Thomas maintained that the
existence of predominately black schools alone does not evidence state
encouraged segregation. Alternatively, Justice Thomas reasoned
that low non-minority enrollment in the School District may evidence
voluntary housing choices or other decisions.2 9
does not admit of judicial intervention absent a constitutional violation." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that such a theory would cause the
courts to rely upon controversial social science data and "rests on an assumption of
black inferiority"). Justice Thomas believed that "[i]nstead of focusing on remedying
the harm done to those black schoolchildren injured by segregation, the District Court
here sought to convert the [District] into a 'magnet district' that would reverse the 'white
flight' caused by desegregation." Id. at 2061-62 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Thomas also stated: "It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume
that anything that is predominately black must be inferior." Id. at 2061 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
205. Id. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that the exercise of
such authority by the federal courts has "trampled upon principles of federalism and the
separation of powers and has freed courts to pursue other agendas unrelated to the narrow
purpose of precisely remedying a constitutional harm." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring) Justice Thomas noted that "[t]he District
Court found that in 1954[,] the [School District] operated 16 segregated schools for
black students, and ... 24 schools remained ... more than 90% black." Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring). See supra part II.B (discussing Brown 1, which in 1954 prohibited segrega-
tion).
207. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas reasoned
that because it had been 30 years since the last State official action proving segregation,
the district court should have shown more than the presence of schools with high black
populations or low test scores as evidence of de facto segregation. Id. at 2063.
(Thomas, J., concurring). Without such a showing, Justice Thomas reasoned that liabil-
ity could rest only on a theory that racial imbalances are unconstitutional. Id. at 2064
(Thomas, J., concurring).
208. Id. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 2062-63 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas argued that prior state-mandated segregation does
not always cause racial imbalances.10 Justice Thomas reasoned that
the district court derived its notion that racial imbalances trigger segre-
gation by misinterpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Brown I 1
Justice Thomas asserted that Brown I did not promote the principle
that racially isolated schools are inherently inferior.2t 2 Therefore, be-
cause the schools in the School District were only racially isolated,
Justice Thomas concluded that Missouri's actions no longer offended
the Constitution.1 3
Second, Justice Thomas attacked the Supreme Court's earlier deci-
sions allowing the district courts to exercise broad remedial authority
in the area of education. 14 Justice Thomas reasoned that district
2 10. Id. at 2064 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas reasoned that the district
court found that "racial imbalances constituted an ongoing constitutional violation that
continued to inflict harm on black students." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
2 11. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that in Brown 1, the Court
relied upon several psychological and sociological studies proving that de jure segrega-
tion generated a feeling of inferiority among black students. Id. (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). See also Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953). The Brown I Court noted that:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detri-men-
tal effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects
the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of
negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive
in a racial[ly] integrated school system."
Id. (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (1951)). The Brown I Court also
stated that separation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to ... [the] status [of blacks]
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done." Id.
212. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2064-65 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas ar-
gued that the Brown I Court found the harm related only to de jure segregation. Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring). "[T]he District Court seemed to believe that black students in
the [School District] would continue to receive an 'inferior education' despite the end of
de jure segregation, as long as de facto segregation persisted." Id. at 2064 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
213. Id. at 2065 (Thomas, J., concurring). "The Constitution does not prevent indi-
viduals from choosing to live together, to work together, or to send their children to
school together, so long as the State does not interfere with their choices on the basis of
race." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
2 14. Id. at 2067 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas noted that in a prior deci-
sion concerning this litigation, the Court approved the continued use of the extraordi-
nary remedies when the need for them had disappeared. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 56-58 (1990)). He also noted that under the
district courts' broad remedial power, they have "directed or managed the reconstruction
of entire institutions and bureaucracies, with little regard for the inherent limitations on
their authority." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
678 (1978) (granting power to district court to manage prisons); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425
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courts presently exercise their remedial power inconsistently with the
history and tradition of equity." 5 Justice Thomas maintained that fed-
eral courts have encroached on the authority of local government with
regard to education.26 Because the federal government cannot ade-
quately address the educational needs of a state, Justice Thomas sug-
gested that federal courts leave such functions to local governments.
2 17
U.S. 284, 305 (1976) (approving district court's remedial order in the area of public
housing).
215. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2067-70. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas rea-
soned that there is no historical record of broad remedial powers. Id. at 2069 (Thomas,
J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Thomas noted that "[clertainly there were no
,structural injunctions' issued by the federal courts, nor were there any examples of con-
tinuing judicial supervision and management of governmental institutions." Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also stated that "we should exercise the power
to impose equitable remedies only sparingly, subject to clear rules guiding its use." Id.
at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring).
2 16. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Federal courts should pause before using their in-
herent equitable powers to intrude into the proper sphere of the States."). See also
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (stating that "local auton-
omy of school districts is a vital national tradition"); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973) (stating that local control over schools gives local
government the freedom to tailor local programs to local needs and "affords some oppor-
tunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational ex-
cellence"). Justice Thomas emphasized that:
A structural reform decree eviscerates a State's discretionary authority over its
own program and budgets and forces state officials to reallocate state resources
and funds to the desegregation plan at the expense of other citizens, other
government programs, and other institutions not represented in court. When
District Courts seize complete control over the schools, they strip State and
local governments of one of their most important governmental responsibili-
ties, and thus deny their existence as independent governmental entities.
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2070. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Specifically, in the present case, Justice Thomas attacked the district court's exercise
of the legislative function of taxing the School District and staffing the School District
schools. Id. at 2070-71 (Thomas, J., concurring). "In this case, not only did the district
court exercise the legislative power to tax, it also engaged in budgeting, staffing, and
educational decisions, in judgments about the location and aesthetic quality of the
schools, and in administrative oversight and monitoring." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas noted that such functions involve legislative or executive power. Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas reasoned that "State and
local school officials not only bear the responsibility for educational decisions, they
also are better equipped than a single federal judge to make the day-to-day policy, curric-
ular, and funding choices necessary to bring a school district into compliance with the
Constitution." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Thomas noted that
federal courts have limited power to effectively oversee local educational programs:
"[flederal courts simply cannot gather sufficient information to render an effective de-
cree, have limited resources to induce compliance, and cannot seek political and public
support for their remedies." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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D. The Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter, focusing on the Court's review of the premises un-
derlying the district court's orders, concluded that the Supreme Court
rendered an opinion inconsistent with findings, evidence, and control-
ling precedent." 8 In examining whetheir the district court properly
considered standardized test scores in deciding if Missouri had ob-
tained partial integration, Justice Souter maintained that, in the instant
case, low test scores properly indicated a lack of partial integration.219
Furthermore, Justice Souter believed that the district court relied on
more than just test scores to determine whether Missouri obtained par-
tial unitary status.2 ° Justice Souter argued that the district court also
relied on Missouri's failure to offer proof of partial unitary status.2
Justice Souter further argued that Missouri failed to show that it had
eliminated, to the extent practicable, the vestiges of prior de jure segre-
218. Id. 2076-78 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that "[the deficien-
cies from which we suffer have led the Court effectively to overrule a unanimous consti-
tutional precedent of 20 years standing, which was not even addressed in argument, was
mentioned merely in passing by one of the parties, and discussed by another of them
only in a misleading way." Id. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting). See infra part V
(discussing this view of Jenkins).
219. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2074 (Souter, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 2016 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that none of the dis-
trict court orders required a certain level of test scores before unitary status could be
achieved. Id. at 2078 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter found support for this posi-
tion in the appellate court decision:
"When we deal with student achievement in a quality education program in the
context of relieving a school district of court supervision, test results must be
considered. Test scores, however, must be only one factor in the equation.
Nothing in this court's opinion, the district court's opinion, or the testimony
of [the School District's] witnesses indicates that test results were the only
criteria used in denying the State's claim that its obligation for the quality ed-
ucation programs should be ended by a declaration [that] they are unitary."
Id. at 2078 (quoting Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1994),
rev'd sub nom. Jenkins v. Missouri, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995)).
221. Id. at 2079 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,
485 (1992) (stating that "[tihe duty and responsibility of a school district once segre-
gated by law is to take all steps necessary to eliminate the vestiges of the unconstitu-
tional de jure system"). Before granting relief from a district court order, a district court
must consider if a constitutional violator has fully and satisfactorily complied with the
order. Id. at 491. Justice Souter noted that "[t]he burden of showing that these condi-
tions to finding partial unitary status have been met rest (as one would expect) squarely
on the constitutional violator who seeks relief from the existing remedial order."
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2079 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter concluded that
Missouri failed to show its compliance with the three-part Freeman test. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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222gation, and failed to demonstrate that it exercised good faith in
complying with the district court's orders.223 In the absence of proof
of substantial integration from Missouri, Justice Souter concluded that
test scores may properly evidence that the ills of deficiency in student
achievement have not been eliminated to the extent practicable.224
Justice Souter then addressed the Court's finding that the district
court rested its approval of salary increases solely on the objective of
attracting non-minority students.22 Justice Souter maintained that the
district court's order regarding salary increases served two distinct
purposes: first, drawing non-minority students; and second, raising
the level of student achievement.226 Justice Souter concluded that the
222. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2079 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that
Missouri maintained only that it had implemented the required educational programs;
Missouri never claimed that implementation of the programs had remedied the reduction
in student achievement. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 2080 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned that the record was
replete with questions concerning Missouri's effort to desegregate the School District.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In the district court's April 16, 1993 order, the district court
noted that Missouri has been historically opposed to any program designed to desegre-
gate the School District. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Furthermore, in its order, the dis-
trict court noted that Missouri never offered a viable or tenable alternative and has been
antagonistic to desegregation decrees. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
224. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that "test scores will clearly be
relevant in determining whether the improvement programs have cured a deficiency in
student achievement to the practicable extent." Id. at 2080-81 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter noted that the relevancy of test scores is open for judgment that will not
prove to be sound until the judgment is supported by the record. Id. at 2081 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
225. Id. at 2081-83 (Souter, J., dissenting). "The Court suggests that the District
Court rested its approval of salary increases only on the object of drawing students into
the district's schools, . . . and rejects the increases for that reason." Id. at 2082-83
(Souter, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 2081 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that:
The District Court had evidence in front of it that adopting the State's position
and discontinuing desegregation funding for salary levels would result in their
abrupt drop to 1986-1987 levels, with the resulting disparity between teacher
pay in the district and the nationwide level increasing to as much as 40-45
percent, and a mass exodus of competent employees likely taking place.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter further noted and quoted the lower court:
"It is evident that the district court had before it substantial evidence of a sta-
tistically significant reduction in the turnover rates for full-time employees, a
dramatic increase in the percentage of certified employees selecting [the
School District] because of the salary increases, and a significant decline in
the number of employees lost to other districts. Further, the court heard testi-
mony that the average performance evaluation for the professional employees
increased. positively and significantly."
Id. at 2082 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 13 F.3d
1170, 1172-74 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Jenkins v. Missouri, 115 S. Ct. 2038
(1995)). See infra part IV.A.2 analyzing Justice Souter's point.
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district court's second purpose alone would justify allowing the district
court's orders to remain in effect.227
Next, Justice Souter considered the validity of the magnet school
program.228 Justice Souter first argued that, because the question of
the validity of the district court's magnet program was not before the
Court, neither party properly briefed or argued the issue and that the
Court had no authority to decide the issue. 229 Next, Justice Souter
stressed that the district court did not define intradistrict violation as the
Court did in its decision.230 Justice Souter reasoned that the record
supported the idea that the district court understood the constitutional
violation to produce effects stretching beyond District borders.23'
Specifically, Justice Souter argued that these effects were significant
even though they did not cause segregation in surrounding districts.
232
With this in mind, Justice Souter concluded that the Court incorrectly
227. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted:
It seems clear, however, that the District Court and the Court of Appeals both
viewed the salary orders as serving two complementary but distinct purposes,
and to the extent that the District Court concludes on remand that its salary or-
ders are justified by reference to the quality of education alone, nothing in the
Court's opinion precludes those orders from remaining in effect.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 2076-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated: "The District Court
meant that the violation within the [District] had not led to segregation outside of it, and
that no other school districts had played a part in the violation. It did not mean that the
violation had not produced effects of any sort beyond the district." Id. (Souter, J., dis-
senting). Justice Souter reasoned that Missouri and the School District committed a
constitutional harm that produced significant non-segregation effects in other districts
and led to greater segregation in the District. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 2084-85 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned that the School
District suffered because of flight to suburban school districts Id. (Souter, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Souter noted that:
While this exodus of white students would not have led to segregation within
the [suburban school districts], which have all been run in a unitary fashion
since the time of Brown, it clearly represented an effect spanning district bor-
ders, and one which the District Court and the Court of Appeals expressly at-
tributed to segregation in the [School District].
Id. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting).
232. Justice Souter argued that these effects were significant "non-segregative" ef-
fects as opposed to "segregative" effects. Id. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter noted that the district court and the court of appeals found Missouri and the
School District's violation caused white flight to surrounding suburban districts and pri-
vate schools. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri 855
F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that the district court found that "the prepon-
derance of black students in the district was due to [Missouri's] and [the School
District's] constitutional violations, which caused white flight"), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, sub nom. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
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rejected the finding of the district court with respect to the magnet
school program.233
Finally, Justice Souter addressed the limitation on the equitable
powers of the district courts. 4 Justice Souter argued that the limita-
tion placed on district courts in Milliken I did not apply in this case.235
Justice Souter reasoned that Milliken I does not propose that "any rem-
edy [which] takes into account conditions outside of the district is an
interdistrict remedy. 236 Justice Souter argued that any other reading
of Milliken I redefines the Court's decision in that case.237
233. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that
the Court lacked authority to review the district court's finding of fact in the absence of
the showing of error. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949) (stating that "[a] court of law,
such as this Court is, rather than a court of correction of errors in fact finding, cannot
undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the absence of a
very obvious and exceptional showing of error").
Justice Souter further argued that the Court based its decision on the position that inte-
gration, not segregation, caused white flight. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2085 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter argued that this distinction is not significant. Id. at 2086
(Souter, J., dissenting).
"[W]hile white flight would have produced significant effects in other school districts,
in the form of greatly increased numbers of white students, those effects would not have
been segregative beyond the [School District], as the departing students were absorbed
to wholly unitary systems." Id. at 2085 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned
that the Court overturned the concurrent factual findings of the district court and court of
appeals in the absence of circumstances which would warrant such actions. Id. at 2087
(Souter, J., dissenting).
234. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2087 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that
"[a]lthough the fashioning of judicial remedies to this end has been left, in the first in-
stance, to the equitable discretion of the district courts, in Milliken I we [the Court] es-
tablished an absolute limitation on this exercise of equitable authority." Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting). See also Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745 (stating that "without an interdistrict
violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdis-
trict remedy").
235. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2087 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned
that in Milliken 1, the district court subjected school districts that had not participated in
the constitutional violation to remedial orders. Id. at 2087. See also Milliken 1, 418
U.S. at 745 (stating that "[t]o approve the remedy ordered by the court would impose on
the outlying districts, not shown to have committed any constitutional violation, a
wholly impermissible remedy based on a standard not hinted at in Brown I and Brown I1
or any holding of this Court"). See also supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text
(discussing Milliken I).
236. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also argued
that "a district court might subject a proven constitutional wrongdoer to a remedy with
intended effects going beyond the district of the wrongdoer's violation, when such a
remedy is necessary to redress the harms flowing from the constitutional violation." Id.
(Souter, J., dissenting).
237. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter noted that the Court read Milliken I as
"forbidding imposition of a remedy on a guilty district with intended consequences in a
neighboring innocent district, unless the constitutional violation yielded segregative
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Next, Justice Souter argued that the Court's decision was inconsis-
tent with its prior decision in Gautreaux.2 18 Justice Souter rejected the
Court's reasoning distinguishing Gautreaux239 and concluded that the
district court's magnet program fell within the scope of its equitable
power as recognized in Gautreaux.24°
2. Justice Ginsburg's Dissenting Opinion
In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg gave a historical account of
segregation and discrimination in Missouri. For instance, Judge
Ginsburg explained that, from 1724 to 1957, Missouri actively partici-
pated in and mandated slavery, discrimination, and segregation.2 4'
Specifically, Justice Ginsburg noted that, in 1847, Missouri prohibited
the creation of schools for blacks,242 and that when blacks were al-
lowed to receive a public education, they had to do so on a separate but
equal basis.243 Not until 1957 did Missouri repeal laws mandating
effects in that innocent district." Id. (Souter, I., dissenting).
238. Id. (Souter, I., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that in Gautreaux, the Court
held that "a district court may indeed subject a governmental perpetrator of segregative
practices to an order for relief with intended consequences beyond the perpetrator's own
subdivision, so long as the decree does not bind the authorities of other governmental
units that are free of violations and segregative effects." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See
also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing Gautreaux).
239. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2089 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that
the Gautreaux Court found the remedy permissible not only because of Chicago's wide
housing market area, but also because the trial court could order a remedy in the market
without binding a governmental unit innocent of the violation and free of its the effects.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also reasoned that in Gautreaux, the "District
Court's method could include subjecting HUD [United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development] to measures going beyond the geographical or political boundaries
of its violation." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned that the district court did not
subject surrounding suburban districts to any remedial obligations but only sought to
improve the operations and quality of the schools in the School District. Id. at 2088
(Souter, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also joined Justice
Souter's dissent. Specifically, she noted several facts: in 1724, Louis XV issued the
first slave code for Missouri; "[blefore the Civil War Missouri law prohibited the cre-
ation or maintenance of schools for educating blacks;" and in 1865, Missouri passed a
series of laws requiring separate public schools for blacks. Id. (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
See e.g., id. (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (quoting 1847 Mo. Laws 103: "No person shall
keep or teach any school for the instruction of negroes or mulattos, in reading or writ-
ing, in this State.").
242. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
243. See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing MO. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 2; Mo.
CONST. of 1875, art. X1, § 3). Missouri's constitution required separate schools. Id.
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Mo. CONST. of 1865, art. IX, § 2; Mo. CONST. of
1875, art. X1, § 3).
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segregation. 24
Justice Ginsburg next indicated that, although the segregation laws
had been repealed, in 1985 the district court found that the schools at
issue still suffered from the lingering effects of once State-mandated
segregation.245 Justice Ginsburg further indicated that Missouri failed
in its affirmative duty to eliminate the effects of its past mandated seg-
regation. 246 Justice Ginsburg noted.that the School District suffered
greatly and retained a segregated school system that remained over
sixty percent black.2 47 Based on these facts, Justice Ginsburg argued
that the Court had responded too quickly in ordering the district court
to relinquish its authority.248
IV. ANALYSIS
In Jenkins, the United States Supreme Court incorrectly decided that
the district court went beyond its remediai power in fashioning reme-
dies.2 49 Furthermore, the Court improperly limited the discretion of
244. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485,
1490 (W.D. Mo. 1984)). Missouri also rescinded similar constitutional provisions in
1976. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The lower court captured the effects of segrega-
tion by stating:
The general attitude of inferiority among blacks produces low achievement...
which ultimately limits employment opportunities and causes poverty ....
While it may be true that poverty results in low achievement regardless of race
.... it is undeniable that most poverty-level families are black .... The
District stipulated that as of 1977 they had not eliminated all the vestiges of
the prior dual system .... The court finds the inferior education indigenous of
the state-compelled dual school system has lingering effects in the Kansas
City, Missouri School District.
Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1492.
246. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Jenkins, 593
F. Supp. at 1492 (noting that the school district was "majority white in enrollment until
1970" and stating that the District "could have achieved a mathematical racial balance in
its schools until that year"). The Court also noted that the School District operated
some segregated schools and some integrated ones. Id.
247. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Jenkins, 639 F.
Supp. at 35 (stating that the School District "enrollment for 1984/1985 was 36,259 to-
tal students with 68.3% of them being Black, 26.7% being non-minority, 3.7%
Hispanic, and 1.3% other minority groups"). Because enrollment in some schools
within the School District was approximately 90% black, there were not enough white
students within the School District to sufficiently integrate the School District. See
supra note 206 and accompanying text.
248. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court de-
clares illegitimate the goal of attracting nonminority students to the Kansas City, Mis-
souri, School District ... . and thus stops the District Court's efforts to integrate ... .
249. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2046.
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the district court in exercising its equitable authority and refused to fo-
cus on the true goals of desegregation cases.250
This Part reviews the majority's severe limitation on the equitable
powers of district courts in desegregation cases. Specifically, this
Part analyzes the limitation placed on the scope of the district court's
authority,252 and the Jenkins Court's broad emphasis on the district
court's goal of desegregative attractiveness.2 53 Finally, this Part ar-
gues that the Court placed undue emphasis on restoring control of the
School District to local authorities and prematurely suggested that the
district court relinquish its authority.2 4
A. Limitation on the District Court's Remedial Authority
Despite its past decisionsz5 that broadened the remedial authority of
the district courts, the United States Supreme Court in Jenkins signifi-
cantly narrowed the scope of that authority. This results in limited
authority for the district courts to remedy segregation. z6
1. The Scope of the District Court's Authority
Under the reasoning of Brown H, district courts must rely on equi-
table doctrines in determining remedies.257 Moreover, the Swann
Court expanded the district courts' power by mandating that districts
take all necessary steps to remove vestiges of state-imposed segrega-
tion.15' The Milliken I Court, however, restricted the power of the
district courts by refusing to allow district courts to apply interdistrict
remedies to intradistrict violations.259
In Jenkins, the Court attempted to resolve the issue of the scope of
the district court's remedial authority by applying the plain language of
250. See id. at 2049-50. The Court found no interdistrict violation and therefore held
that the district court's goal of desegregative attractiveness was an interdistrict remedy
and beyond the authority of the court. Id.
251. See infra part IV.A-B.
252. See infra part IV.A-B.
253. See infra part V.A.I.
254. See infra part IV.B.
255. See supra notes 70-121 and accompanying text discussing past decisions.
256. David G. Savage, Ruling On Affirmative Action: Court Deals Blow To School
Desegregation Rules; Education: Justices Say Low Achievement Levels of Minority
Schools Don't Justify Long-Term Judicial Control, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at AI5.
"Taken together, the . . . rulings make clear that the justices are willing to end desegre-
gation programs even if black students remain isolated from whites and attend city
schools where achievement is low." Id.
257. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing equitable doctrines).
258. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Swann).
259. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing Milliken 1).
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its other decisions.2 60 The Court correctly recognized that in the ab-
sence of an interdistrict harm there can be no remedy that affects out-
side districts. 26' Nevertheless, the Court mistakenly interpreted this
principle as support for the Court's holding that district court could not
apply a broad remedy that does not adversely affect other districts to
combat a violation.262
While it appears from the language of Milliken I that interdistrict
remedies can be imposed only to combat interdistrict violations, the
Court interpreted Milliken I to encompass a broad meaning. 263 Al-
though the Court relied on Milliken I to support its holding that the
district court exceeded its remedial authority,26 previous interpreta-
tions evidence that Milliken I did not limit the district courts' equitable
power to the extent suggested by the Court.265 Milliken I simply sup-
ported the proposition that a district court's remedial orders cannot
bind school districts that have not participated in a constitutional viola-
tion.266 The Court's reliance on such a broad reading of the remedy
260. In Milliken I, the Court held that in the absence of a interdistrict violation and
interdistrict effect, there can not be an interdistrict remedy. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717,
745 (1974). Because the Jenkins Court found no interdistrict violation, it refused to al-
low the district court to implement an interdistrict remedy. See supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
261. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2050. See also Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745 (stating that
without an interdistrict violation there can be no interdistrict remedy). See also supra
notes 177-79 and accompanying text (explaining why the Jenkins Court found that the
district court went beyond its remedial power).
262. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting). "[W]e left open the possi-
bility that a district court might subject a proven constitutional wrongdoer to a remedy
with intended effects going beyond the district of the wrongdoer's violation, when such
a remedy is necessary to redress the harms flowing from the constitutional violation."
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See also Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744 (stating that "[wie . . .
turn to address, for the first time, the validity of a remedy mandating cross-district or in-
terdistrict consolidation to remedy a condition of segregation found to exist in only one
district").
263. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct at 2087-90 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court did not have
to rely on its reasoning in Gautreaux, as Justice Souter did, in reaching this conclusion.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2052-53. The Court noted that the district court failed to meet the test of
Milliken I, which required a finding of significant interdistrict effects before an interdis-
trict remedy can be imposed. Id. at 2052; see Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745.
265. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 298 (1976) (stating that "[n]othing in the
Milliken [1] decision suggests a Per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order par-
ties found to have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the
municipal boundaries of the City where the violation occurred"). See generally Ruiz,
supra note 93, at 8-9 (discussing Milliken i).
266. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 305. The Gautreaux Court stated that in Milliken I the
district court's remedial order was impermissible because of the limits placed on federal
courts to interfere with the operation of state and local government not charged with a
constitutional violation. Id.
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limitation is inconsistent with the intent of Brown IA which gives dis-
trict courts broad discretion in eliminating the vestiges of past segrega-
tion.
Justice Souter in his dissent argued that the district court's orders
should have been upheld, consistent with the Court's logic in
Freeman.268 In Swann, the Court empowered the district courts with
the ability to take every necessary step to eliminate the vestiges of past
segregation.2 69 The Jenkins Court failed to consider the reasonable-
ness of applying an interdistrict remedy to combat an intradistrict vio-
lation that affected other districts, even though that effect did not cause
segregation within surrounding districts. 270 Likewise, because the
Court's prior decisions appeared to advocate the use of broad remedial
authority,27' the Jenkins Court set a dangerous precedent by ignoring
its prior support of broad remedial powers and instead emphasizing its
remedy limitation.
267. See Brown 11, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (giving courts the authority to consider
whether the actions of school authorities constitute good faith implementations). The
Brown II Court stated that:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equi-
table principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and rec-
onciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these
traditional attributes of equity power.
Id. at 300.
268. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2079-88 (Souter, J. dissenting) (citing Freeman, 503
U.S. 467, 491 (1992)).
269. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971)
(stating that "a school desegregation case does not differ fundamentally from other cases
involving [the] framing of the equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional
right"). The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective interests,
the condition that offends the Constitution. See Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 297 (noting
that, in the event of a constitutional violation, the court should use all reasonable meth-
ods available to formulate an effective remedy).
270. See supra part II1.B. The Jenkins Court noted that there was no finding of a con-
stitutional violation and precluded the district court from fashioning an interdistrict
remedy. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2052-54. The Jenkins Court further stated that "[a] dis-
trict court seeking to remedy an intradistrict violation that has not 'directly caused' sig-
nificant interdistrict effects . . . exceeds its remedial authority if it orders a remedy with
an interdistrict purpose." Id. at 2053-54.
27 1. See generally Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 297 (noting that district courts have broad
remedial authority); Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (noting
that, "[h]aving once found a violation, the district judge or school authorities should
make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking
into account the practicalities of the situation"); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (1971) (stating
that "[o]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equi-
table powers to remedy past wrongs is broad for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies"); Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (noting that, when fashioning
remedies, district courts should be guided by traditional notions of equitable remedies).
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The Jenkins Court seemingly overlooked the original goals of de-
segregation. 72 Although education is the most important function of
the state, 3 the Court refused to allow the district court to retain juris-
diction until blacks in the district received equal education 4.27  The
Court ignored the fact that test scores properly evidenced the inequal-
ity.2 75 Also, the Court refused to allow the district court to retain au-
thority over the School District until black children in the School
District reached their highest potential, or at least a level equal to that of
surrounding school districts. 76 Similarly, because the district court's
orders did not bind districts who did not participate in a constitutional
violation, the orders should have been upheld. 77
Accordingly, the Jenkins Court departed from twenty years of
precedent and failed to examine correctly its past decisions discussing
-district courts' remedial authority in desegregation cases. 278 The clear
purpose of any remedy in a desegregation case is to eliminate, to the
extent practicable, all vestiges of past segregation.2 79 An examination
of the district court's ultimate purpose might have led the Court to up-
hold the district court's remedial orders on grounds that the district
court designed those orders to eliminate the effects of prior State-man-
dated segregation. 80 For instance, the orders not only required the
School District to upgrade the facilities to equal those of surrounding
white suburban districts, but also focused on improving the low test
scores of blacks within the School District.28" '
District courts do not have limitless power to fashion desegregation
remedies and must tailor remedies according to the nature and scope of
the violation. 82 Nevertheless, unlike Jenkins, the Brown H decision
272. See supra part IL.D and note 100 and accompanying text (discussing the goal of
desegregation orders).
273. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
274. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.
275. Id. But see Edward Felsenthal, High Court Decision Seeks to End Federal Judges'
Supervision of Programs, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1995, at A2 (stating that "the school
districts' progress in remedying the effects of segregation can't be measured by compar-
ing students' test scores with normal averages").
276. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055-56; see Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493 (explaining that
children cannot succeed without an equal education).
277. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Jenkins, the district
court's order sought to attract non-minorities into the district; it did not mandate that
any other district participate in remedial orders. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
278. The goal of the district court in desegregation cases is to eliminate all vestiges
of state-imposed desegregation. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
279. Id.
280. See id.
281. See supra part III.A.
282. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744 (noting that the court is to tailor the scope of the
19961
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advocated giving district courts broad discretion in exercising their re-
medial authority.283 Thus, in the instant case, the Court mistakenly
found that the district court went beyond its remedial power when the
district court took all necessary steps to rid the School District of the
vestiges of prior State-mandated segregation.284
2. Desegregative Attractiveness Versus Quality Education
As Justice Souter emphasized in his dissent in Jenkins, the Court
failed to examine the validity of the district court's orders in two im-
portant areas.285 First, the majority did not address the issue of
whether the district court adequately identified raising the level of stu-
dent achievement as a goal.286 The Court instead focused on the dis-
trict court's goal of achieving non-minority attractiveness and deter-
mined such a goal to be inappropriate.287 Because the district court
fashioned its remedy in response to evidence of identified low
achievement in the School District as a vestige of past segregation, the
Court mistakenly refused to uphold the district court's orders on that
basis alone.288
Second, the Court incorrectly dismissed the lower court's finding
that prior State-imposed segregation caused white flight.289 The Court
remedy to fit the nature and extent of the violation); Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300 (stating
that courts should use the traditional equitable powers when drafting remedies).
283. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300. See supra part II.C (discussing Brown 11).
284. See generally Joan Biskupic, Desegregation Remedies Rejected; Justices Say
School Solutions Must Address Specific Discrimination, WASH. POST, June 13, 1995, at
Al (discussing Jenkins). Biskupic noted that "[t]he Court ruled that desegregation reme-
dies should be tailored to address documented discrimination with a district, rather than
to improve its standing among other districts, as the higher spending was intended to
do." Id.
285. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2081 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the district
court wanted to improve the level of student achievement as well as reduce white flight).
286. Id. at 2055. The Jenkins Court stated that the goal of desegregative attractive-
ness was beyond the remedial authority of the district court. Id. See also id. at 2082-83
(Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court reasoned that the district court rested its
approval of salary increases only on the objective of drawing non-minorities into the
district).
287. Id. at 2055. The Court noted that such a goal is too far removed from the task of
eliminating racial identifiability in the School District. Id.
288. Id. at 2083 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that because the district court's
salary increase order served the purpose of improving the level of quality education in
the District, the Court's opinion should not have precluded the district court's order from
remaining in effect).
289. Id. at 2052 n.8. The Court noted that there was evidence that desegregation, not
segregation, caused white flight. id. at 2052. The Court noted that "'[d]uring the hear-
ing on the liability issue in this case there was an abundance of evidence that many resi-
dents of the [School District] left the [School District] and moved to the suburbs because
of the [School District's] effort to integrate its schools."' Id. at 2052 n.8 (quoting App.
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seemingly ignored the possibility that, if Missouri had never initially
maintained a segregated school system, the schools would not have
experienced white flight due to segregation or integration.2 90 The
Court overlooked the possibility that, without such desegregation or-
ders, the black children of the School District would have never re-
ceived educational facilities and programs equal to that of surrounding
white suburban schools.29' Hence, regardless of the immediate under-
lying reason for white flight, the district court correctly tailored the
goal of eliminating white flight to remedy the constitutional viola-
tion.292
B. Relinquishing Authority to Local Government
In Jenkins, the Court suggested that the district court apply the
Freeman test 293 to determine if Missouri had sufficiently integrated its
schools.294 The Court further suggested that the district court consider
239). See also United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491
(1972) (noting that desegregation may cause white flight).
290. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued
that: "The Court stresses that the present remedial programs have been in place for
seven years .... But compared to more than two centuries of firmly entrenched official
discrimination, the experience with the desegregation remedies ordered by the District
Court has been evanescent." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg noted that, "[gliven the deep, inglorious history of segregation in
Missouri, to curtail desegregation at this time and in this manner is an action at once too
swift and too soon." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Felsenthal, supra note 275,
at A2 (noting that Justice Ginsburg read the history of Missouri's segregation practices
to justify the remedy proposed by the district court).
291. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2086 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the parties
agreed that before the district court's remedial plan, "the schools in the unreformed seg-
regated system were physically a shambles"). See also Dennis Farney, Fading Dream?
Integration Is Faltering in Kansas City Schools as Priorities Change, WALL ST. J., Sept.
26, 1995, at Al. Commentators say that black parents' and black community leaders'
"overriding concern is not recruiting more white students, although they would welcome
them if they came. Their overriding concern is getting a quality education for their own
children." Id.
292. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2085 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter suggested
that "[tihere would be no desegregation orders and no remedial plans without prior un-
constitutional segregation as the occasion for issuing and adopting them, and an adverse
reaction to a desegregation order is traceable in fact to the segregation that is subject to
the remedy." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter further stated that it made no dif-
ference if segregation or desegregation caused white flight. Id. at 2086 (Souter, J., dis-
senting).
293. See supra part II.E and note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the Freeman
test).
294. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055. "In reconsidering this order, the District Court
should apply our three-part test from Freeman v. Pitts." Id. (citation omitted). See supra
note 172 and accompanying text.
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whether all of the district court orders had been implemented. 295 This
line of reasoning correctly implies that the district courts are not to re-
tain jurisdiction over the schools for an indefinite period of time.296 In
so finding, however, the Court departed from long-standing precedent
stating that no matter what remedial plan is adopted, the court shall re-
tain jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been
completely removed.297
The Jenkins Court placed undue emphasis on the goal of restoring
the control of the School District to local authorities. 8 Although the
goal of returning control to local authorities should not be overlooked,
the goal of achieving integration is most important and should not be
disregarded in an effort to return control of the schools to local au-
thorities.299 When the court attempts to correct the effects of a dual
education system, every aspect of that system must be eradicated, in-
cluding low test scores of minority students. 30 0  Furthermore, the
Court ignored the fact that sometimes the process of removing the ef-
fects of segregation is necessarily lengthy.30' Considering that black
children in the School District suffered from inadequate school facili-
ties and inferior education for many years, the Court perhaps failed to
give the district court the necessary authority and time to rid the School
District of all the effects of prior segregation.302 Jenkins removed ju-
dicial supervision before the School District met the goal of desegrega-
tion.
295. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2055. "The District Court also should consider that many
goals of its quality education plan already have been attained: the [School District] now
is equipped with 'facilities and opportunities not available anywhere else in the coun-
try."' Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. A- 115).
296. Id. at 2056. "On remand, the District Court must bear in mind that its end pur-
pose is not only 'to remedy the violation' to the extent practicable, but also 'to restore
state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is operating in compli-
ance with the Constitution."' Id. (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)).
297. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968); Landsberg, supra note
79, at 845.
298. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2090 (Souter, J., dissenting). "The Court stresses that
the present remedial programs have been in place for seven years." Id. at 2091
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
299. Landsberg, supra note 79, at 849. Where segregation laws created dual systems
all aspects of those systems must be eradicated. Id.
300. Id.
301. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted
in her concurring opinion that as early as 1724, Missouri participated in a form of seg-
regation and as late as 1985 the vestiges of prior segregation lingered. Id. (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Court, and Justice Souter in his dissent, failed to pro-
vide lower federal district courts with a criteria for determining when
courts should return authority to local school districts.0 3 The Court
mistakenly discouraged the federal courts from considering concrete
factors, such as improved test scores, when determining if federal
courts should relinquish authority.3"4 Instead, the Court perhaps en-
couraged lower courts to consider the physical attributes of the schools
even though those attributes will likely deteriorate when funding
ceases.
305
V. IMPACT
A. The Impact of Jenkins on Remedial Authority
The Jenkins decision significantly restricts the federal courts in fash-
ioning effective desegregation orders.30 6 The Jenkins decision pre-
vents district courts from achieving realistic desegregation goals,
which can be realized only through the use of broad remedial or-
ders.30 7 In cases where purely intradistrict violations are found, dis-
trict courts must sometimes fashion remedies which will ultimately
have some remote effect on outside districts.30 8 In the shadow of the
Jenkins decision, the most appropriate remedies to segregation will be
foregone in favor of less effective or ineffective ones."
303. Felsenthal, supra note 275, at A2. At least one scholar states that the Jenkins
opinion "is ambiguous about exactly when judges must abandon their role in the process
[of desegregation]." Id.
304. Id. The court explicitly limited the use of test scores in measuring the effective-
ness of desegregation programs. Id.
305. Id. Felsenthal stated that "[fthe opinion makes it clear that schools are required
to 'provide equality of opportunity' but not equality of output." Id. (quoting Missouri
Attorney General Jay Nixon). See also Biskupic, supra note 284, at Al (stating that the
Court rejected arguments that higher test scores by blacks could indicate that programs
had remedied the vestiges of past segregation and remanded the case to determine if the
district court should end its jurisdiction over the case).
306. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
307. The Jenkins decision is a perfect example of a case where the district court could
not significantly achieve a remedy without affecting non-violating districts as well.
308. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2087. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976)
(holding that Milliken I was not a per se bar to fashioning remedies that effect districts
outside the boundaries of the violators district).
309. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2038. In Jenkins, the School District suffered from
"rotted facilities." Id. at 2075 (Souter, J., dissenting). The district court found that the
"overall condition of the [School District] particularly the interior, is generally depress-
ing and thus adversely effect the learning environment and continues to discourage par-
ents who might otherwise enroll their children in the [School District]." Jenkins v.
Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 403 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988). The district court also
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Further, the Jenkins decision prevents district courts from taking all
steps necessary to eliminate the lingering effects of historical segrega-
tion within a particular district. ° The dissolution of vestigial segre-
gation is the ultimate goal of remedial desegregation measures. 3' The
Jenkins Court's reasoning effectively bars district courts from truly
desegregating districts that suffer not only from the effect of present-
day de facto segregation, but also from the effects of prior de jure seg-
regation, which is the primary target of equal protection law.31 2
The Jenkins decision not only limits the remedial authority of district
courts, but it also incorrectly prioritizes the restoration of control to lo-
cal authorities.313 The Jenkins Court de-emphasized the primary ob-
jective of the federal district courts to eliminate the effects of segrega-
tion to the extent practicable, and instead focused on relinquishing
control to the school authorities.
With such a focus, the Jenkins Court may have invited challenges to
district court orders. Where district court orders have been imple-
mented, states can now argue that they have sufficiently integrated
previously segregated districts and should, therefore, be released from
their desegregation orders, regardless of whether any vestiges of seg-
regation remain. 1 4 Thus, school districts are now encouraged to
supplant de jure segregation with de facto segregation and to do indi-
found that:
The [School District] facilities still have numerous health and safety hazards,
educational and environmental hazards, functional impairments, and appear-
ance impairments . . . . The specific problems include: inadequate lighting;
peeling paint and crumbling plaster on ceiling walls and corridors; loose tiles,
torn floor coverings, odors resulting from unventilated restrooms with rotted,
corroded toilet fixtures; noisy classrooms due to lack of adequate acoustical
treatment, etc.
Id.
3 10. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text. See also Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (stating that district courts must take
all necessary steps to eliminate the lingering effects of segregation).
3 11. See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2056 (noting that the end purpose, among other
things, is to remedy the violation). See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489
(1972) (stating that "[w]e have said that the court's end purpose must be to remedy the
violation").
312. See Jenkins, !15 S. Ct. at 2056.
313. See id. The Court stressed the district court's goal of restoring state and local
government control over the schools. Id. See also Felsenthal, supra note 275, at A2
(stating that "[t]he court is sending a strong signal that it is sick of these cases").
314. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Farney, supra
note 291, at Al (noting that desegregation efforts benefit children because they provide
funding for quality education that will otherwise not be provided); Savage, supra note
256, at Al (stating that Chief Justice Rehnquist has consistently argued that school de-
segregation orders should end once school officials have complied with the orders).
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rectly what the Constitution prohibits them from doing directly. 3 5 To
prevent such de facto segregation, courts should be permitted to con-
sider the harms caused by prior state-imposed segregation, such as
low test scores and under-funded minority facilities.316
B. Returning to Plessy v. Ferguson
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion announces the proposition that
separate can now be equal.317 The focus of the Jenkins decision pro-
vides states with ammunition to attack the underlying objective of de-
segregation remedies.3t8 Plessy's reasoning that the state is entitled to
segregate when it suits certain members of the citizenry is once again a
viable principle. 319 The Jenkins decision discourages federal district
courts from taking all necessary steps to rid school districts of deseg-
regation effects.32 ° Indeed, states are now encouraged to make facial
efforts to cease their de jure segregation, while maintaining covert seg-
regative policies. 32' Thus, Jenkins may serve to sentence victims of
segregation to eternal separate and unequal status with little hope of a
remedy for their unequal treatment.3 2
Even if Jenkins does not return the federal district courts to uphold-
ing the standard of "separate but equal," it returns the Court to some-
thing similar to the post Plessy era. Thus, school districts essentially
315. See Biskupic, supra note 284, at Al (noting that, after the Jenkins decision, the
"school systems can gradually free themselves from a judge's supervision orders by
[simply] showing that they have taken every practical step and have a good faith com-
mitment to achieving desegregation").
3 16. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2078-79 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that examining
test scores is a proper way of determining if the School District removed the vestiges of
past segregation).
317. See Steven A. Holmes, Look Who's Saying Separate Is Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
1, 1995, at Al (stating that "[I]ast month though some black members of school boards
in Denver and Kansas City, Mo. questioned whether trying to force whites to mix with
black children was not only demeaning to blacks but unnecessary to achieve equal
academic opportunities"). The article quotes a member of the Kansas City school board
as stating that segregation is dead. Id. See also Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2061 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (stating that predominately black does not denote inferiority and
rationalizing that black schools are not necessarily a product of a constitutional vi-
olation).
318. Farney, supra note 291, at Al (noting that citizens of Kansas City, Missouri
question the district court judge's motive for desegregating the School District).
3 19. See supra note 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing Plessy).
320. Savage, supra note 256, at Al (noting that, in the past, student desegregation
orders were called off before district courts achieved adequate integration).
321. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2090-91 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the Jenkins
Court transformed the Milliken I decision into a arbitrary and mechanical shield for con-
stitutional violators).
322. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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may be required only to temporarily upgrade facilities, leaving minor-
ity children far from receiving equality in education.3 The Court
loses the heart of the Brown I decision, that education is the most im-
portant function of state government, and allows states to continue
providing minorities with meager educational facilities of poor qual-
ity. 3
24
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins significantly
limits the broad remedial power granted to the district courts. It pre-
vents the district courts from fashioning remedies that adequately ad-
dress the vestiges of past segregation. Moreover, the Jenkins Court
provided district courts with little guidance to evaluate the appropriate
point at which a state should be released from a court order. The
Court's decision does not enumerate criteria for definitively determin-
ing what degree of state action constitutes compliance sufficient to re-
store a state's authority. Additionally, the Jenkins holding deviates
from prior Supreme Court decisions which generally held that district
courts have broad remedial authority. Finally, the Court failed to pro-
vide realistic alternative segregation remedies to the ones currently in
place and has essentially bound the hands of the federal district courts
from doing so themselves.
CHELSEY PARKMAN
323. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
324. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1953).
764 [Vol. 27
